



MS. ERNST

1
00:02:47,350 --> 00:00:53,750
foreign

2
00:03:14,589 --> 00:02:49,070
thank you

3
00:03:18,710 --> 00:03:17,149
the hearing will come to order I'd first

4
00:03:21,050 --> 00:03:18,720
like to thank our witness Dr Sean

5
00:03:22,910 --> 00:03:21,060
Kirkpatrick for testifying here and in

6
00:03:24,710 --> 00:03:22,920
today's earlier closed session and for

7
00:03:26,570 --> 00:03:24,720
his long and distinguished career both

8
00:03:29,030 --> 00:03:26,580
in the intelligence community and in the

9
00:03:31,070 --> 00:03:29,040
Department of Defense Dr Kirkpatrick is

10
00:03:33,770 --> 00:03:31,080
the director of the all domain anomaly

11
00:03:36,110 --> 00:03:33,780
resolution office or Arrow Congress

12
00:03:37,490 --> 00:03:36,120
established this office in law to get to

13
00:03:39,949 --> 00:03:37,500

the bottom of the very serious problem

14

00:03:42,830 --> 00:03:39,959
of unidentified anomalous phenomenon or

15

00:03:45,050 --> 00:03:42,840
UAP Dr Kirkpatrick has a very difficult

16

00:03:46,910 --> 00:03:45,060
Mission while we have made progress

17

00:03:49,130 --> 00:03:46,920
there remains a stigma attached to these

18

00:03:51,710 --> 00:03:49,140
phenomenon there is a vast and complex

19

00:03:53,570 --> 00:03:51,720
citizen engagement and there's also very

20

00:03:55,789 --> 00:03:53,580
challenging scientific and Technical

21

00:03:58,369 --> 00:03:55,799
hurdles so we appreciate the willingness

22

00:04:00,050 --> 00:03:58,379
of Dr Kirkpatrick to lean in on this

23

00:04:01,850 --> 00:04:00,060
issue and the work that he has

24

00:04:03,710 --> 00:04:01,860
accomplished thus far and we look

25

00:04:05,930 --> 00:04:03,720
forward to both his opening statement

26
00:04:09,229 --> 00:04:05,940
and his presentation of examples of the

27
00:04:11,210 --> 00:04:09,239
work Arrow has done in late 2017 media

28
00:04:12,890 --> 00:04:11,220
reports surfaced about activity set in

29
00:04:15,410 --> 00:04:12,900
motion by the late long-serving majority

30
00:04:17,330 --> 00:04:15,420
leader Senator Harry Reid more than a

31
00:04:18,830 --> 00:04:17,340
decade ago we learned that there was

32
00:04:20,270 --> 00:04:18,840
strong evidence that advanced technology

33
00:04:21,710 --> 00:04:20,280
reflected in the features and

34
00:04:24,409 --> 00:04:21,720
performance characteristics of many

35
00:04:26,450 --> 00:04:24,419
objects observed by our highly trained

36
00:04:28,550 --> 00:04:26,460
service members operating top of the

37
00:04:30,650 --> 00:04:28,560
line military equipment

38
00:04:32,570 --> 00:04:30,660

we learned that for the at least the

39

00:04:34,430 --> 00:04:32,580

past eight years military Pilots

40

00:04:36,590 --> 00:04:34,440

frequently encountered unknown objects

41

00:04:38,510 --> 00:04:36,600

in controlled airspace off both the east

42

00:04:40,730 --> 00:04:38,520

and west coast across the continental

43

00:04:43,610 --> 00:04:40,740

United States in test and training areas

44

00:04:45,530 --> 00:04:43,620

and ranges we don't know where they are

45

00:04:47,570 --> 00:04:45,540

they come from who made them or how they

46

00:04:49,969 --> 00:04:47,580

operate as former deputy secretary of

47

00:04:51,530 --> 00:04:49,979

defense David norquist observed had any

48

00:04:53,570 --> 00:04:51,540

of these objects had the label made in

49

00:04:55,370 --> 00:04:53,580

China there would be an uproar in the

50

00:04:57,230 --> 00:04:55,380

government and media there would be no

51
00:04:59,210 --> 00:04:57,240
stone unturned and no efforts spared to

52
00:05:00,650 --> 00:04:59,220
find out what we were dealing with we

53
00:05:02,810 --> 00:05:00,660
can look at the recent incursion of the

54
00:05:04,370 --> 00:05:02,820
unidentified PRC high altitude balloon

55
00:05:06,409 --> 00:05:04,380
for as an example

56
00:05:08,170 --> 00:05:06,419
because and but because of the UFO

57
00:05:11,090 --> 00:05:08,180
stigma the response has been

58
00:05:13,129 --> 00:05:11,100
irresponsibly anemic and slow Congress

59
00:05:15,409 --> 00:05:13,139
established Arrow we made it clear that

60
00:05:17,030 --> 00:05:15,419
we expect vigorous action we added very

61
00:05:19,490 --> 00:05:17,040
substantial initial funding for the

62
00:05:21,409 --> 00:05:19,500
office but despite our best efforts the

63
00:05:23,629 --> 00:05:21,419

president's budget for fiscu is 23 and

64

00:05:25,610 --> 00:05:23,639

24 requested only enough funding to

65

00:05:27,830 --> 00:05:25,620

defray the operating expenses of Arrow

66

00:05:29,150 --> 00:05:27,840

it included almost no funds to sustain

67

00:05:30,529 --> 00:05:29,160

the critical research and development

68

00:05:32,390 --> 00:05:30,539

necessary to support a serious

69

00:05:34,249 --> 00:05:32,400

investigation it took a letter to

70

00:05:36,350 --> 00:05:34,259

secretary Austin from Senator Rubio and

71

00:05:38,090 --> 00:05:36,360

me and 14 other Senators to get the

72

00:05:40,310 --> 00:05:38,100

office temporary relief for the current

73

00:05:43,010 --> 00:05:40,320

fiscal year in this hearing I tend to

74

00:05:44,629 --> 00:05:43,020

probe a series of specific issues in the

75

00:05:46,550 --> 00:05:44,639

recent incidents where multiple objects

76

00:05:48,110 --> 00:05:46,560

were shot down over North America it

77

00:05:50,450 --> 00:05:48,120

seemed that Pentagon leadership did not

78

00:05:52,370 --> 00:05:50,460

turn to Aero office to play a leading

79

00:05:53,810 --> 00:05:52,380

role in advising the combatant commander

80

00:05:55,249 --> 00:05:53,820

we need to know whether this will

81

00:05:57,230 --> 00:05:55,259

continue we need to know whether the

82

00:05:58,790 --> 00:05:57,240

leadership in DOD will bring Arrow into

83

00:06:00,890 --> 00:05:58,800

the decision-making process in a visible

84

00:06:02,570 --> 00:06:00,900

way and we need to know what role era

85

00:06:05,330 --> 00:06:02,580

will play in inter-agency coordination

86

00:06:07,610 --> 00:06:05,340

after the NSC working group display fans

87

00:06:09,290 --> 00:06:07,620

in the fiscal year 2023 National Defense

88

00:06:11,450 --> 00:06:09,300

and intelligence authorization acts

89

00:06:13,189 --> 00:06:11,460

Congress established a direct reporting

90

00:06:15,350 --> 00:06:13,199

chain from the arrow director to the

91

00:06:16,790 --> 00:06:15,360

deputy secretary of defense the role of

92

00:06:18,590 --> 00:06:16,800

the office of the under secretary of

93

00:06:20,450 --> 00:06:18,600

defense for intelligence and security is

94

00:06:22,490 --> 00:06:20,460

limited to providing administrative

95

00:06:25,249 --> 00:06:22,500

support we need to know how this

96

00:06:27,170 --> 00:06:25,259

direction is being implemented uapf

97

00:06:29,270 --> 00:06:27,180

frequently observed flying in extremely

98

00:06:30,890 --> 00:06:29,280

high or very low speeds and come in

99

00:06:32,330 --> 00:06:30,900

various sizes and shapes during the

100

00:06:35,689 --> 00:06:32,340

recent shoot Downs over North America

101
00:06:37,309 --> 00:06:35,699
DOD disclosed that filters on radar

102
00:06:38,930 --> 00:06:37,319
systems were adjusted to allow for

103
00:06:40,850 --> 00:06:38,940
detection and tracking of diverse sets

104
00:06:42,770 --> 00:06:40,860
of objects for the first time while

105
00:06:45,110 --> 00:06:42,780
opening the aperture can overload the

106
00:06:46,790 --> 00:06:45,120
real-time analytic process we cannot

107
00:06:48,350 --> 00:06:46,800
keep turning a blind eye to surveillance

108
00:06:50,570 --> 00:06:48,360
data that is critical to detecting

109
00:06:52,010 --> 00:06:50,580
attracting UAP we need to know whether

110
00:06:53,809 --> 00:06:52,020
Dr Kirkpatrick could achieve the

111
00:06:56,210 --> 00:06:53,819
necessary control over sensor filters

112
00:06:58,309 --> 00:06:56,220
and the storage and access to Raw

113
00:07:00,409 --> 00:06:58,319

surveillance data to find UAP anomalies

114

00:07:02,510 --> 00:07:00,419

finally one of the tasks Congress set

115

00:07:05,150 --> 00:07:02,520

for Arrow is serving as an open door for

116

00:07:07,430 --> 00:07:05,160

Witnesses of UAP events or participants

117

00:07:09,469 --> 00:07:07,440

in government activities related to uaps

118

00:07:10,969 --> 00:07:09,479

to come forward securely and disclose

119

00:07:13,249 --> 00:07:10,979

what they know without fear of

120

00:07:15,170 --> 00:07:13,259

Retribution for any possible violations

121

00:07:17,450 --> 00:07:15,180

of previously signed non-disclosure

122

00:07:19,610 --> 00:07:17,460

agreements Congress mandated that arrow

123

00:07:21,469 --> 00:07:19,620

set up a publicly discoverable and

124

00:07:23,390 --> 00:07:21,479

accessible process for safe disclosure

125

00:07:25,129 --> 00:07:23,400

while we know that Arrow has already

126

00:07:27,650 --> 00:07:25,139

conducted a significant a number of

127

00:07:29,390 --> 00:07:27,660

interviews many referred by Congress we

128

00:07:31,490 --> 00:07:29,400

need to set up a public process that

129

00:07:33,230 --> 00:07:31,500

that and we need to know where that

130

00:07:34,490 --> 00:07:33,240

effort stands with that I'd like to turn

131

00:07:36,589 --> 00:07:34,500

to Senator Ernst for her opening

132

00:07:38,570 --> 00:07:36,599

statement thank you madam chair and

133

00:07:41,390 --> 00:07:38,580

thank you Dr Kirkpatrick for your

134

00:07:43,790 --> 00:07:41,400

testimony today I'll keep these remarks

135

00:07:46,430 --> 00:07:43,800

very brief so that we have maximum time

136

00:07:48,350 --> 00:07:46,440

for your briefing the recent Downing of

137

00:07:49,909 --> 00:07:48,360

the Chinese surveillance surveillance

138

00:07:52,129 --> 00:07:49,919

balloon and three other objects

139

00:07:55,010 --> 00:07:52,139

underscores the need for domain

140

00:07:57,290 --> 00:07:55,020

awareness adversaries like China and

141

00:08:00,290 --> 00:07:57,300

Russia are working to hold U.S interests

142

00:08:03,409 --> 00:08:00,300

including our homeland at risk that's

143

00:08:05,510 --> 00:08:03,419

why your testimony is so important and I

144

00:08:07,969 --> 00:08:05,520

so look forward to a progress update on

145

00:08:09,650 --> 00:08:07,979

the establishment of your office as

146

00:08:11,629 --> 00:08:09,660

members know your office evolved from

147

00:08:14,570 --> 00:08:11,639

the navy-led unidentified aerial

148

00:08:17,029 --> 00:08:14,580

phenomena task force to the all-domain

149

00:08:19,909 --> 00:08:17,039

anomalous resolution office known as

150

00:08:22,689 --> 00:08:19,919

Arrow Dr Kirkpatrick your extensive

151

00:08:26,270 --> 00:08:22,699

background in science and technology

152

00:08:28,070 --> 00:08:26,280

research and development and space makes

153

00:08:30,890 --> 00:08:28,080

you well suited to discuss these

154

00:08:33,529 --> 00:08:30,900

emerging challenges my priority is that

155

00:08:36,889 --> 00:08:33,539

we understand the full range of threats

156

00:08:39,170 --> 00:08:36,899

posed by our adversaries in all domains

157

00:08:41,870 --> 00:08:39,180

that is what the Joint Force needs to be

158

00:08:44,329 --> 00:08:41,880

prepared to fight and win in defense of

159

00:08:46,250 --> 00:08:44,339

our nation this committee needs to know

160

00:08:48,889 --> 00:08:46,260

about Chinese or Russian advanced

161

00:08:50,990 --> 00:08:48,899

technology programs to exploit our

162

00:08:53,509 --> 00:08:51,000

vulnerabilities and it needs to know

163

00:08:55,910 --> 00:08:53,519

whether your office along with the IC

164

00:08:58,490 --> 00:08:55,920

has detected potential Chinese or

165

00:09:01,130 --> 00:08:58,500

Russian capabilities to surveil or

166

00:09:03,850 --> 00:09:01,140

attack us finally we need to ensure

167

00:09:07,670 --> 00:09:03,860

efficient interagency coordination

168

00:09:11,090 --> 00:09:07,680

multiple elements of the dod and IC own

169

00:09:14,090 --> 00:09:11,100

a piece of this mission to add value

170

00:09:16,490 --> 00:09:14,100

arrows efforts cannot be redundant with

171

00:09:19,070 --> 00:09:16,500

others thank you again we look forward

172

00:09:21,170 --> 00:09:19,080

to your testimony

173

00:09:23,329 --> 00:09:21,180

Dr Kirkpatrick you can give your

174

00:09:25,910 --> 00:09:23,339

testimony

175

00:09:27,889 --> 00:09:25,920

thank you chairwoman Jewel brand ranking

176

00:09:29,269 --> 00:09:27,899

member Ernst distinguished members of

177

00:09:30,949 --> 00:09:29,279

the subcommittee

178

00:09:33,710 --> 00:09:30,959

it's a privilege to be here today to

179

00:09:35,570 --> 00:09:33,720

testify on the defense defense's efforts

180

00:09:36,650 --> 00:09:35,580

to address unidentified anomalous

181

00:09:38,509 --> 00:09:36,660

phenomena

182

00:09:40,490 --> 00:09:38,519

first I want to thank Congress for its

183

00:09:41,870 --> 00:09:40,500

extensive and continued partnership as

184

00:09:44,449 --> 00:09:41,880

the department works to better

185

00:09:46,070 --> 00:09:44,459

understand and respond to UAP in an

186

00:09:47,690 --> 00:09:46,080

effort to minimize Technical and

187

00:09:50,389 --> 00:09:47,700

intelligence surprise

188

00:09:52,370 --> 00:09:50,399

unidentified objects in any domain pose

189

00:09:55,130 --> 00:09:52,380

potential risks to Safety and Security

190

00:09:56,449 --> 00:09:55,140

particularly from military personnel and

191

00:09:59,269 --> 00:09:56,459

capabilities

192

00:10:02,090 --> 00:09:59,279

Congress and DOD agree that UAP cannot

193

00:10:04,009 --> 00:10:02,100

remain unexamined or unaddressed

194

00:10:05,750 --> 00:10:04,019

we are grateful for sustained

195

00:10:07,790 --> 00:10:05,760

Congressional engagement on this issue

196

00:10:09,769 --> 00:10:07,800

which paved the way for the dod's

197

00:10:12,650 --> 00:10:09,779

establishment of the all-domain anomaly

198

00:10:15,290 --> 00:10:12,660

resolution office in July of last year

199

00:10:18,050 --> 00:10:15,300

though arrow is still a young office the

200

00:10:19,910 --> 00:10:18,060

spotlight on UAP in recent months

201
00:10:22,550 --> 00:10:19,920
underscores the importance of its work

202
00:10:24,170 --> 00:10:22,560
and the need for UAP to be taken

203
00:10:25,490 --> 00:10:24,180
seriously as a matter of National

204
00:10:27,290 --> 00:10:25,500
Security

205
00:10:30,110 --> 00:10:27,300
all leadership that I've had the

206
00:10:33,290 --> 00:10:30,120
pleasure of working with whether DOD IC

207
00:10:35,210 --> 00:10:33,300
doe civil scientific or industrial view

208
00:10:36,590 --> 00:10:35,220
Congress as a critical partner in this

209
00:10:39,170 --> 00:10:36,600
endeavor

210
00:10:41,269 --> 00:10:39,180
Arrow has accomplished much in the last

211
00:10:43,250 --> 00:10:41,279
nine months since it was established the

212
00:10:45,710 --> 00:10:43,260
Aero team of more than three dozen

213
00:10:48,290 --> 00:10:45,720

experts is organized around four

214

00:10:50,449 --> 00:10:48,300

functional areas operations scientific

215

00:10:52,430 --> 00:10:50,459

research integrated analysis and

216

00:10:54,290 --> 00:10:52,440

strategic Communications

217

00:10:55,970 --> 00:10:54,300

in the nine months since era's

218

00:10:59,630 --> 00:10:55,980

establishment we've taken important

219

00:11:01,790 --> 00:10:59,640

steps to involve and improve UAP data

220

00:11:04,670 --> 00:11:01,800

collection standardize the Department's

221

00:11:06,410 --> 00:11:04,680

UAP internal reporting requirements and

222

00:11:09,230 --> 00:11:06,420

Implement a framework for rigorous

223

00:11:11,569 --> 00:11:09,240

scientific and intelligence analysis

224

00:11:14,090 --> 00:11:11,579

allowing us to resolve cases in a

225

00:11:16,490 --> 00:11:14,100

systematic and prioritized manner

226
00:11:18,530 --> 00:11:16,500
meanwhile consistent with legislative

227
00:11:20,990 --> 00:11:18,540
direction arrow is also carefully

228
00:11:22,970 --> 00:11:21,000
reviewing and researching the U.S

229
00:11:24,410 --> 00:11:22,980
government's UAP related historical

230
00:11:26,630 --> 00:11:24,420
record

231
00:11:28,130 --> 00:11:26,640
arrow is leading a focused effort to

232
00:11:29,810 --> 00:11:28,140
better characterize understand and

233
00:11:32,329 --> 00:11:29,820
attribute UAP

234
00:11:35,870 --> 00:11:32,339
with priority given to UAP reports by

235
00:11:37,730 --> 00:11:35,880
DOD and IC Personnel in or near areas of

236
00:11:40,490 --> 00:11:37,740
National Security importance

237
00:11:41,449 --> 00:11:40,500
DOD fully appreciates the eagerness from

238
00:11:43,670 --> 00:11:41,459

many

239

00:11:45,110 --> 00:11:43,680

quarters especially here in Congress and

240

00:11:47,750 --> 00:11:45,120

in the American public to quickly

241

00:11:49,730 --> 00:11:47,760

resolve every UAP encountered across the

242

00:11:50,690 --> 00:11:49,740

globe from the distant pass through

243

00:11:52,790 --> 00:11:50,700

today

244

00:11:55,610 --> 00:11:52,800

it's important to note however

245

00:11:57,769 --> 00:11:55,620

arrow is the culmination of Decades of

246

00:11:59,449 --> 00:11:57,779

DOD intelligence community and

247

00:12:01,730 --> 00:11:59,459

congressionally directed efforts to

248

00:12:03,710 --> 00:12:01,740

successfully resolve UAP encountered

249

00:12:06,410 --> 00:12:03,720

first and foremost by U.S military

250

00:12:07,850 --> 00:12:06,420

personnel specifically Navy and Air

251
00:12:10,250 --> 00:12:07,860

Force pilots

252
00:12:12,530 --> 00:12:10,260

the law establishing arrow is ambitious

253
00:12:15,290 --> 00:12:12,540

and it will take time to realize the

254
00:12:18,710 --> 00:12:15,300

full mission we cannot answer Decades of

255
00:12:21,230 --> 00:12:18,720

questions about UAP all at once but we

256
00:12:22,910 --> 00:12:21,240

must begin somewhere while I assure you

257
00:12:25,490 --> 00:12:22,920

that Arrow will follow scientific

258
00:12:28,069 --> 00:12:25,500

evidence wherever it leads I ask for

259
00:12:29,750 --> 00:12:28,079

your patience as DOD first prioritizes

260
00:12:31,970 --> 00:12:29,760

Safety and Security of our military

261
00:12:33,230 --> 00:12:31,980

personnel and installations in all

262
00:12:35,870 --> 00:12:33,240

domains

263
00:12:38,150 --> 00:12:35,880

after all a UAP encountered first by

264

00:12:40,430 --> 00:12:38,160

highly capable DOD and IC platforms

265

00:12:43,370 --> 00:12:40,440

featuring the nation's most advanced

266

00:12:45,889 --> 00:12:43,380

sensors are those UAP most likely to be

267

00:12:47,210 --> 00:12:45,899

resolved by my office assuming the data

268

00:12:49,790 --> 00:12:47,220

can be collected

269

00:12:51,949 --> 00:12:49,800

if Arrow succeeds in first improving the

270

00:12:54,170 --> 00:12:51,959

ability of military personnel to quickly

271

00:12:56,690 --> 00:12:54,180

and confidently resolve UAP they

272

00:12:58,670 --> 00:12:56,700

encounter I believe that in time we will

273

00:13:00,050 --> 00:12:58,680

have greatly Advanced the capability of

274

00:13:02,150 --> 00:13:00,060

the entire United States government

275

00:13:03,710 --> 00:13:02,160

including its civilian agencies to

276
00:13:06,230 --> 00:13:03,720
resolve UAP

277
00:13:08,990 --> 00:13:06,240
however it would be naive to believe

278
00:13:11,210 --> 00:13:09,000
that the resolution of all UAP can be

279
00:13:11,930 --> 00:13:11,220
solely accomplished by the dod and IC

280
00:13:13,850 --> 00:13:11,940
alone

281
00:13:15,829 --> 00:13:13,860
we will need to prioritize collection

282
00:13:17,509 --> 00:13:15,839
and leverage authorities for monitoring

283
00:13:18,769 --> 00:13:17,519
all domains within the continental

284
00:13:20,870 --> 00:13:18,779
United States

285
00:13:22,629 --> 00:13:20,880
Arrow's ultimate success will require

286
00:13:25,310 --> 00:13:22,639
Partnerships with the interagency

287
00:13:26,930 --> 00:13:25,320
industry Partners Academia and the

288
00:13:27,949 --> 00:13:26,940

scientific Community as well as the

289

00:13:29,690 --> 00:13:27,959

public

290

00:13:32,030 --> 00:13:29,700

Aero is partnering with the services

291

00:13:33,590 --> 00:13:32,040

intelligence Community doe as well as

292

00:13:35,870 --> 00:13:33,600

civil partners and across the U.S

293

00:13:37,730 --> 00:13:35,880

government to tap into this resources of

294

00:13:40,430 --> 00:13:37,740

the interagency

295

00:13:43,009 --> 00:13:40,440

the UAP challenge is more an operational

296

00:13:44,509 --> 00:13:43,019

and scientific issue than it is an

297

00:13:46,790 --> 00:13:44,519

intelligence issue

298

00:13:48,710 --> 00:13:46,800

as such we are working with industry

299

00:13:50,990 --> 00:13:48,720

Academia and the scientific Community

300

00:13:53,509 --> 00:13:51,000

which bring their own resources ideas

301
00:13:55,129 --> 00:13:53,519
and expertise to this challenging

302
00:13:57,350 --> 00:13:55,139
problem set

303
00:13:59,449 --> 00:13:57,360
robust collaboration and peer review

304
00:14:01,250 --> 00:13:59,459
across a broad range of Partners will

305
00:14:04,310 --> 00:14:01,260
promote greater objectivity and

306
00:14:06,769 --> 00:14:04,320
transparency in the study of UAP

307
00:14:09,170 --> 00:14:06,779
I want to underscore today that only a

308
00:14:11,449 --> 00:14:09,180
very small percentage of UAP reports

309
00:14:14,269 --> 00:14:11,459
display signatures that could reasonably

310
00:14:16,490 --> 00:14:14,279
be described as anomalous the majority

311
00:14:18,650 --> 00:14:16,500
of unidentified objects reported to

312
00:14:21,050 --> 00:14:18,660
Arrow demonstrate mundane

313
00:14:23,389 --> 00:14:21,060

characteristics of balloons unmanned

314

00:14:26,210 --> 00:14:23,399

aerial systems clutter natural phenomena

315

00:14:28,430 --> 00:14:26,220

other readily explainable sources

316

00:14:30,889 --> 00:14:28,440

while a large number of cases in our

317

00:14:33,829 --> 00:14:30,899

Holdings remain technically unresolved

318

00:14:36,110 --> 00:14:33,839

this is primarily due to a lack of data

319

00:14:38,329 --> 00:14:36,120

associated with those cases without

320

00:14:40,310 --> 00:14:38,339

sufficient data we are unable to reach

321

00:14:42,949 --> 00:14:40,320

defendable conclusions

322

00:14:45,170 --> 00:14:42,959

that meet the high scientific standards

323

00:14:47,210 --> 00:14:45,180

we set for resolution and I will not

324

00:14:48,829 --> 00:14:47,220

close a case that I cannot defend the

325

00:14:50,689 --> 00:14:48,839

conclusions of

326

00:14:53,030 --> 00:14:50,699

I recognize that this answer is

327

00:14:54,769 --> 00:14:53,040

unsatisfying to those who in good faith

328

00:14:56,569 --> 00:14:54,779

assume that what they see with their

329

00:14:58,910 --> 00:14:56,579

eyes with their cameras and what their

330

00:15:00,590 --> 00:14:58,920

Radars is incontrovertible evidence of

331

00:15:01,670 --> 00:15:00,600

extraordinary characteristics and

332

00:15:03,470 --> 00:15:01,680

performance

333

00:15:05,629 --> 00:15:03,480

yet time and again with sufficient

334

00:15:08,290 --> 00:15:05,639

scientific quality data it is fact that

335

00:15:11,870 --> 00:15:08,300

UAP often but not always

336

00:15:13,970 --> 00:15:11,880

resolve into readily explainable sources

337

00:15:15,949 --> 00:15:13,980

humans are subject to deception and

338

00:15:18,410 --> 00:15:15,959

Illusions sensors to unexpected

339

00:15:20,750 --> 00:15:18,420

responses and malfunctions and in some

340

00:15:22,730 --> 00:15:20,760

cases intentional interference

341

00:15:24,530 --> 00:15:22,740

getting to the handful of cases that

342

00:15:25,970 --> 00:15:24,540

pass this level of scrutiny is the

343

00:15:28,310 --> 00:15:25,980

mission of era

344

00:15:30,230 --> 00:15:28,320

that is not to say that UAP once

345

00:15:32,509 --> 00:15:30,240

resolved they're no longer of National

346

00:15:34,790 --> 00:15:32,519

Security interest however on the

347

00:15:37,069 --> 00:15:34,800

contrary learning that a UAP isn't of

348

00:15:39,769 --> 00:15:37,079

exotic origin but is instead just a

349

00:15:41,269 --> 00:15:39,779

quadcopter or balloon leads to the

350

00:15:44,030 --> 00:15:41,279

question of who is operating that

351

00:15:45,829 --> 00:15:44,040

quadcopter into what purpose

352

00:15:47,990 --> 00:15:45,839

the answers to those questions will

353

00:15:50,389 --> 00:15:48,000

inform potential National Security or

354

00:15:52,189 --> 00:15:50,399

law enforcement responses

355

00:15:53,810 --> 00:15:52,199

arrow is a member of the Department's

356

00:15:55,910 --> 00:15:53,820

support to the administration's tiger

357

00:15:58,009 --> 00:15:55,920

team effort to deal with stratospheric

358

00:15:59,389 --> 00:15:58,019

objects such as the PRC high altitude

359

00:16:02,569 --> 00:15:59,399

balloon

360

00:16:05,269 --> 00:16:02,579

well when previously unknown objects are

361

00:16:07,370 --> 00:16:05,279

successfully identified it is Arrow's

362

00:16:10,069 --> 00:16:07,380

role too quickly and efficiently hand

363

00:16:12,170 --> 00:16:10,079

off such readily explainable objects to

364

00:16:13,970 --> 00:16:12,180

the intelligence law enforcement or

365

00:16:16,970 --> 00:16:13,980

operational safety communities for

366

00:16:19,069 --> 00:16:16,980

further analysis and appropriate action

367

00:16:22,310 --> 00:16:19,079

in other words Arrow's mission is to

368

00:16:24,410 --> 00:16:22,320

turn UAP into SCP somebody else's

369

00:16:27,110 --> 00:16:24,420

problem

370

00:16:28,910 --> 00:16:27,120

the U.S government the dod and the IC in

371

00:16:31,069 --> 00:16:28,920

particular has tremendous capabilities

372

00:16:34,430 --> 00:16:31,079

to deal with those encountered objects

373

00:16:35,990 --> 00:16:34,440

in the wake of the PRC Hab event the

374

00:16:37,970 --> 00:16:36,000

interagency is working to better

375

00:16:38,769 --> 00:16:37,980

integrate and share information to

376

00:16:41,930 --> 00:16:38,779

address

377

00:16:44,269 --> 00:16:41,940

identifiable stratospheric objects but

378

00:16:46,610 --> 00:16:44,279

that is not all arrows Lane

379

00:16:49,189 --> 00:16:46,620

meanwhile for the few cases in all

380

00:16:50,870 --> 00:16:49,199

domains space air and sea

381

00:16:53,090 --> 00:16:50,880

that do demonstrate potentially

382

00:16:55,610 --> 00:16:53,100

anomalous characteristics Arrow exists

383

00:16:57,949 --> 00:16:55,620

to help the dod IC and interagency

384

00:17:00,410 --> 00:16:57,959

resolve those anomalous cases

385

00:17:01,910 --> 00:17:00,420

in doing so arrow is approaching these

386

00:17:04,789 --> 00:17:01,920

cases with the highest level of

387

00:17:06,470 --> 00:17:04,799

objectivity and analytic rigor this

388

00:17:08,030 --> 00:17:06,480

includes physically testing and

389

00:17:10,789 --> 00:17:08,040

employing modeling and simulation

390

00:17:12,590 --> 00:17:10,799

validate our analyzes and underlying

391

00:17:14,169 --> 00:17:12,600

theories then peer reviewing those

392

00:17:16,370 --> 00:17:14,179

results within the US government

393

00:17:18,409 --> 00:17:16,380

industry partners and appropriately

394

00:17:20,689 --> 00:17:18,419

cleared academic institutions before

395

00:17:22,610 --> 00:17:20,699

reaching any conclusions

396

00:17:24,829 --> 00:17:22,620

I should also State clearly for the

397

00:17:27,230 --> 00:17:24,839

record that in our research Arrow has

398

00:17:29,390 --> 00:17:27,240

found no credible evidence thus far of

399

00:17:32,090 --> 00:17:29,400

extraterrestrial activity off-world

400

00:17:33,710 --> 00:17:32,100

technology or objects that defy the

401
00:17:36,169 --> 00:17:33,720
known laws of physics

402
00:17:38,570 --> 00:17:36,179
in the event sufficient scientific data

403
00:17:40,610 --> 00:17:38,580
were ever obtained that a UAP

404
00:17:43,070 --> 00:17:40,620
encountered can only be explained by

405
00:17:44,930 --> 00:17:43,080
extraterrestrial origin we are committed

406
00:17:47,690 --> 00:17:44,940
to working with our interagency partners

407
00:17:50,150 --> 00:17:47,700
at Nasa to appropriately inform U.S

408
00:17:52,730 --> 00:17:50,160
government's leadership of its findings

409
00:17:54,470 --> 00:17:52,740
for those few cases that have leaked to

410
00:17:56,870 --> 00:17:54,480
the public previously and subsequently

411
00:17:58,549 --> 00:17:56,880
commented on by the U.S government I

412
00:18:00,289 --> 00:17:58,559
encourage those who hold alternative

413
00:18:02,390 --> 00:18:00,299

theories or views to submit your

414

00:18:04,669 --> 00:18:02,400

research to Credible peer-reviewed

415

00:18:06,470 --> 00:18:04,679

scientific journals arrow is working

416

00:18:09,470 --> 00:18:06,480

very hard to do the same

417

00:18:10,789 --> 00:18:09,480

that is how science works not by blog or

418

00:18:12,830 --> 00:18:10,799

social media

419

00:18:15,470 --> 00:18:12,840

we know that there is tremendous public

420

00:18:18,710 --> 00:18:15,480

interest in UAP and a desire for answers

421

00:18:21,289 --> 00:18:18,720

from Arrow by its very nature the UAP

422

00:18:23,810 --> 00:18:21,299

challenge has for decades lent itself to

423

00:18:26,930 --> 00:18:23,820

mystery sensationalism and even

424

00:18:29,330 --> 00:18:26,940

conspiracy for that reason Arrow remains

425

00:18:31,430 --> 00:18:29,340

committed to transparency accountability

426
00:18:34,190 --> 00:18:31,440
and to sharing as much with the American

427
00:18:36,289 --> 00:18:34,200
public as we can consistent with Our

428
00:18:38,930 --> 00:18:36,299
obligation to protect and not only

429
00:18:41,090 --> 00:18:38,940
intelligence sources and methods but U.S

430
00:18:43,970 --> 00:18:41,100
and Allied capabilities

431
00:18:46,310 --> 00:18:43,980
however Arrow's work will take time if

432
00:18:48,529 --> 00:18:46,320
we are committed to do it right it means

433
00:18:49,850 --> 00:18:48,539
adhering to the scientific method and

434
00:18:52,909 --> 00:18:49,860
the highest standards of research

435
00:18:55,130 --> 00:18:52,919
Integrity it means being methodical and

436
00:18:57,529 --> 00:18:55,140
scrupulous it means withholding judgment

437
00:18:59,690 --> 00:18:57,539
in favor of evidence it means following

438
00:19:02,210 --> 00:18:59,700

the data where it leads wherever it

439

00:19:04,250 --> 00:19:02,220

leads it means establishing scientific

440

00:19:05,930 --> 00:19:04,260

peer-reviewed theoretical underpinnings

441

00:19:08,330 --> 00:19:05,940

of observed data

442

00:19:09,470 --> 00:19:08,340

an arrow is committed to all of those

443

00:19:11,390 --> 00:19:09,480

standards

444

00:19:14,270 --> 00:19:11,400

I'm proud of Arrow's progress over the

445

00:19:16,669 --> 00:19:14,280

last nine months months much remains to

446

00:19:19,010 --> 00:19:16,679

be done but the hard work is underway

447

00:19:20,810 --> 00:19:19,020

thank you for your continued support and

448

00:19:22,909 --> 00:19:20,820

before we turn to questions I'm going to

449

00:19:24,710 --> 00:19:22,919

walk you through some of our analytical

450

00:19:29,210 --> 00:19:24,720

Trends in a couple of cases that we've

451
00:19:36,049 --> 00:19:32,049
so one of the things that Arrow does is

452
00:19:38,750 --> 00:19:36,059
high integrity analysis as I've said

453
00:19:42,770 --> 00:19:38,760
this chart represents

454
00:19:45,650 --> 00:19:42,780
the trend analysis of all the cases in

455
00:19:48,529 --> 00:19:45,660
arrows Holdings right to date

456
00:19:51,289 --> 00:19:48,539
what you'll see on the left is a

457
00:19:55,090 --> 00:19:51,299
histogram of all of our reported

458
00:20:00,529 --> 00:19:55,100
sightings as a function of altitude

459
00:20:01,850 --> 00:20:00,539
so most of our sightings occur in the 15

460
00:20:04,250 --> 00:20:01,860
to 25

461
00:20:05,570 --> 00:20:04,260
000 foot range and that is ultimately

462
00:20:07,909 --> 00:20:05,580
because that's where a lot of our

463
00:20:10,909 --> 00:20:07,919

aircraft are

464

00:20:14,090 --> 00:20:10,919

on the far right upper corner you'll see

465

00:20:17,090 --> 00:20:14,100

a breakout of the morphologies of all of

466

00:20:19,850 --> 00:20:17,100

the UAP that are reported over half

467

00:20:25,250 --> 00:20:19,860

about 52 percent of what's been reported

468

00:20:27,590 --> 00:20:25,260

to us are round orb spheres

469

00:20:29,750 --> 00:20:27,600

the rest of those break out into all

470

00:20:31,510 --> 00:20:29,760

kinds of different other shapes the gray

471

00:20:34,850 --> 00:20:31,520

box is

472

00:20:37,070 --> 00:20:34,860

essentially there's no data on what its

473

00:20:39,710 --> 00:20:37,080

shape is either it wasn't reported or

474

00:20:43,370 --> 00:20:39,720

the sensor did not collect it

475

00:20:45,950 --> 00:20:43,380

the bottom map is a heat map of all

476
00:20:48,409 --> 00:20:45,960
reporting areas across the globe that we

477
00:20:51,289 --> 00:20:48,419
have available to us

478
00:20:54,049 --> 00:20:51,299
what you'll notice is that there is a

479
00:20:57,250 --> 00:20:54,059
heavy what we call collection bias both

480
00:21:01,070 --> 00:20:57,260
in altitude and in geographic location

481
00:21:03,110 --> 00:21:01,080
that's where all of our sensors exist

482
00:21:04,909 --> 00:21:03,120
that's where our training ranges are

483
00:21:08,510 --> 00:21:04,919
that's where our operational ranges are

484
00:21:11,330 --> 00:21:08,520
that's where all of our platforms are

485
00:21:15,010 --> 00:21:11,340
in the middle what we have done is

486
00:21:19,730 --> 00:21:15,020
reduce the most typically reported UAP

487
00:21:22,669 --> 00:21:19,740
characteristics to these fields mostly

488
00:21:25,250 --> 00:21:22,679

round mostly one to four meters white

489

00:21:28,190 --> 00:21:25,260

silver translucent metallic

490

00:21:30,409 --> 00:21:28,200

ten thousand thirty thousand feet

491

00:21:33,529 --> 00:21:30,419

with apparent velocities from the

492

00:21:36,289 --> 00:21:33,539

stationary to Mach 2. no thermal

493

00:21:39,049 --> 00:21:36,299

exhausts usually detected we get

494

00:21:42,110 --> 00:21:39,059

intermittent radar returns we get

495

00:21:44,630 --> 00:21:42,120

intermittent radio returns and we get

496

00:21:47,090 --> 00:21:44,640

intermittent thermal signatures

497

00:21:50,390 --> 00:21:47,100

that's what we're looking for and trying

498

00:21:50,400 --> 00:21:53,630

next slide

499

00:21:59,590 --> 00:21:55,970

so I'm going to walk you through two

500

00:22:03,350 --> 00:21:59,600

cases that we've Declassified recently

501
00:22:06,649 --> 00:22:03,360
this first one is an MQ-9 in the Middle

502
00:22:09,770 --> 00:22:06,659
East observing that blow up which is an

503
00:22:13,250 --> 00:22:09,780
apparent spherical object vo EO sensors

504
00:22:17,870 --> 00:22:14,630
if you want to go ahead and click that

505
00:22:22,310 --> 00:22:20,210
you'll see it come through the top of

506
00:22:25,610 --> 00:22:22,320
the screen there it goes and then the

507
00:22:27,710 --> 00:22:25,620
camera will slew to follow it

508
00:22:29,930 --> 00:22:27,720
you'll see it pop in and out of the

509
00:22:32,390 --> 00:22:29,940
screw field of view there

510
00:22:34,190 --> 00:22:32,400
this is essentially all of the data we

511
00:22:37,190 --> 00:22:34,200
have associated with this event from

512
00:22:42,049 --> 00:22:39,169
it is going to be virtually impossible

513
00:22:44,270 --> 00:22:42,059

to fully identify that

514

00:22:46,549 --> 00:22:44,280

just based off of that video

515

00:22:50,210 --> 00:22:46,559

now what we can do and what we are doing

516

00:22:53,090 --> 00:22:50,220

is keeping that as part of that

517

00:22:56,029 --> 00:22:53,100

group of 52 percent

518

00:22:58,130 --> 00:22:56,039

to see what are the similarities what

519

00:23:00,169 --> 00:22:58,140

are the trends across all these do we

520

00:23:02,990 --> 00:23:00,179

see these in a particular distribution

521

00:23:05,630 --> 00:23:03,000

do they all behave the same or not

522

00:23:07,610 --> 00:23:05,640

as we get more data

523

00:23:10,490 --> 00:23:07,620

we will be able to go back and look at

524

00:23:13,130 --> 00:23:10,500

these in a fuller context

525

00:23:15,409 --> 00:23:13,140

how are we going to get more data we are

526
00:23:17,450 --> 00:23:15,419
working with the joint staff to issue

527
00:23:20,510 --> 00:23:17,460
guidance to all the services and

528
00:23:22,130 --> 00:23:20,520
commands that will then establish what

529
00:23:24,230 --> 00:23:22,140
are the reporting requirements the

530
00:23:26,510 --> 00:23:24,240
timeliness and all of the data that is

531
00:23:30,470 --> 00:23:26,520
required to be delivered to us and

532
00:23:32,510 --> 00:23:30,480
retained from all the associated sensors

533
00:23:34,610 --> 00:23:32,520
that historically hasn't been the case

534
00:23:36,950 --> 00:23:34,620
and it's been happenstance that data has

535
00:23:39,890 --> 00:23:36,960
been collected

536
00:23:44,390 --> 00:23:39,900
next slide

537
00:23:47,870 --> 00:23:44,400
this particular event South Asia MQ-9

538
00:23:50,210 --> 00:23:47,880

looking at another MQ-9 and what's

539

00:23:53,149 --> 00:23:50,220

highlighted there in that red circle is

540

00:23:55,669 --> 00:23:53,159

an object that flies through the screen

541

00:23:57,590 --> 00:23:55,679

unlike the previous one

542

00:23:59,270 --> 00:23:57,600

this one actually shows some really

543

00:24:02,330 --> 00:23:59,280

interesting things that everyone thought

544

00:24:04,549 --> 00:24:02,340

was truly anomalous to start with first

545

00:24:06,830 --> 00:24:04,559

of all it's a high speed object that's

546

00:24:10,909 --> 00:24:06,840

flying in the field of regard of two

547

00:24:13,250 --> 00:24:10,919

mq-9s second it appears to have this

548

00:24:15,649 --> 00:24:13,260

trail behind it

549

00:24:19,430 --> 00:24:15,659

all right which at first blush you would

550

00:24:23,210 --> 00:24:19,440

think that looks like a propulsion Trail

551
00:24:25,010 --> 00:24:23,220
in reality if you want to play the first

552
00:24:27,529 --> 00:24:25,020
slide we'll show you what that looks

553
00:24:30,950 --> 00:24:27,539
like in real time or first video so

554
00:24:32,870 --> 00:24:30,960
we're looking at that there it goes

555
00:24:34,730 --> 00:24:32,880
once you play it again and then pause it

556
00:24:36,350 --> 00:24:34,740
halfway through

557
00:24:38,029 --> 00:24:36,360
right there

558
00:24:40,850 --> 00:24:38,039
all right if you might be able to see

559
00:24:43,490 --> 00:24:40,860
that trail there behind it

560
00:24:46,570 --> 00:24:43,500
that's actually not a real trail that is

561
00:24:49,070 --> 00:24:46,580
a sensor artifact

562
00:24:51,289 --> 00:24:49,080
each one of those little blobs is

563
00:24:53,510 --> 00:24:51,299

actually a representation of the object

564

00:24:56,149 --> 00:24:53,520

as it's moving through and later in the

565

00:25:00,529 --> 00:24:56,159

video as the

566

00:25:03,049 --> 00:25:00,539

as the camera slews that trail actually

567

00:25:07,010 --> 00:25:03,059

follows the direction of the camera not

568

00:25:09,470 --> 00:25:07,020

the direction of the object

569

00:25:11,210 --> 00:25:09,480

we pulled these apart frame by frame we

570

00:25:13,149 --> 00:25:11,220

were able to demonstrate that that is

571

00:25:15,529 --> 00:25:13,159

essentially a readout

572

00:25:18,049 --> 00:25:15,539

overlap of the image it's a it's a

573

00:25:20,049 --> 00:25:18,059

shadow image right it's not real

574

00:25:23,149 --> 00:25:20,059

further if you later

575

00:25:26,210 --> 00:25:23,159

follow this all the way to end it starts

576

00:25:28,070 --> 00:25:26,220

to resolve itself into that blob that's

577

00:25:30,289 --> 00:25:28,080

in that picture in the top of the right

578

00:25:32,090 --> 00:25:30,299

and if you squint it looks like an

579

00:25:33,830 --> 00:25:32,100

aircraft because it actually turns out

580

00:25:36,769 --> 00:25:33,840

to be an aircraft go ahead and put that

581

00:25:41,690 --> 00:25:39,230

so you'll see the tail sort of pop out

582

00:25:44,090 --> 00:25:41,700

there and so what you're looking at is

583

00:25:46,130 --> 00:25:44,100

this is in the infrared this is the Heat

584

00:25:48,350 --> 00:25:46,140

Signature off of the

585

00:25:50,269 --> 00:25:48,360

engines of a commuter aircraft that

586

00:25:53,810 --> 00:25:50,279

happen to be flying in the vicinity of

587

00:25:56,330 --> 00:25:53,820

where those two mq9s were at

588

00:25:57,769 --> 00:25:56,340

why am i showing you this so the first

589

00:26:00,710 --> 00:25:57,779

one that I showed you we don't have

590

00:26:04,130 --> 00:26:00,720

resolved yet right that is an unresolved

591

00:26:06,950 --> 00:26:04,140

case we are still studying this one we

592

00:26:08,990 --> 00:26:06,960

can resolve but this is the kind of data

593

00:26:11,630 --> 00:26:09,000

that we have to work with and the type

594

00:26:13,669 --> 00:26:11,640

of analysis that we have to do which can

595

00:26:16,549 --> 00:26:13,679

be quite extensive when you have to pull

596

00:26:19,490 --> 00:26:16,559

these apart frame by frame

597

00:26:22,490 --> 00:26:19,500

further we're now matching all of this

598

00:26:25,789 --> 00:26:22,500

with the models of all of those Imaging

599

00:26:28,310 --> 00:26:25,799

sensors so that I can say I can recreate

600

00:26:30,110 --> 00:26:28,320

this I can actually show how the sensor

601
00:26:32,390 --> 00:26:30,120
is going to respond

602
00:26:35,510 --> 00:26:32,400
all of these sensors don't necessarily

603
00:26:37,549 --> 00:26:35,520
respond the way you think they do

604
00:26:41,029 --> 00:26:37,559
especially out in the world and in the

605
00:26:45,110 --> 00:26:42,710
and I believe that's all I have and I

606
00:26:48,289 --> 00:26:45,120
will open it up for years of questions

607
00:26:50,630 --> 00:26:48,299
thank you so much Dr crew Patrick can

608
00:26:54,769 --> 00:26:50,640
you just give us some raw numbers of how

609
00:26:56,390 --> 00:26:54,779
many uaps you've analyzed how many have

610
00:26:58,190 --> 00:26:56,400
been resolved and sort of in what

611
00:27:00,490 --> 00:26:58,200
buckets and then how many are still left

612
00:27:03,830 --> 00:27:00,500
to be resolved just an update from your

613
00:27:06,909 --> 00:27:03,840

January public report where it was 366

614

00:27:09,590 --> 00:27:06,919

or something in about 150 were were

615

00:27:11,269 --> 00:27:09,600

balloons in about two dozen were drones

616

00:27:15,409 --> 00:27:11,279

you know just give us an update if you

617

00:27:21,110 --> 00:27:15,419

have one sure so as of this week we are

618

00:27:24,590 --> 00:27:21,120

tracking over a total of 650 cases

619

00:27:26,630 --> 00:27:24,600

now the report in January basically said

620

00:27:29,570 --> 00:27:26,640

about half of the ones at that time

621

00:27:31,909 --> 00:27:29,580

about 150 were balloon were likely

622

00:27:34,730 --> 00:27:31,919

balloon-like or something like that that

623

00:27:36,710 --> 00:27:34,740

doesn't mean they're resolved so what

624

00:27:40,190 --> 00:27:36,720

let me when we walk everyone through

625

00:27:42,289 --> 00:27:40,200

what our analytic process looks like

626

00:27:45,289 --> 00:27:42,299

we have a essentially a

627

00:27:47,750 --> 00:27:45,299

five-step process right so we have we

628

00:27:52,549 --> 00:27:47,760

get our cases in with all the data we

629

00:27:56,149 --> 00:27:52,559

create a case uh for that event

630

00:27:59,029 --> 00:27:56,159

my team does a preliminary scrub of all

631

00:28:01,610 --> 00:27:59,039

of those cases as they come in just to

632

00:28:04,370 --> 00:28:01,620

sort out do we have any information that

633

00:28:06,409 --> 00:28:04,380

says this is in one of those likely

634

00:28:09,890 --> 00:28:06,419

categories it's likely a balloon it's

635

00:28:11,210 --> 00:28:09,900

likely a balloon a bird it's likely some

636

00:28:14,029 --> 00:28:11,220

other object

637

00:28:18,110 --> 00:28:14,039

or we don't know

638

00:28:20,870 --> 00:28:18,120

then we prioritize those based off of

639

00:28:22,789 --> 00:28:20,880

where they are are they attached to a

640

00:28:25,810 --> 00:28:22,799

national security area

641

00:28:28,669 --> 00:28:25,820

does it show some anomalous

642

00:28:30,649 --> 00:28:28,679

phenomenology that is of interest if

643

00:28:33,350 --> 00:28:30,659

it's just if it's just a spherical thing

644

00:28:35,990 --> 00:28:33,360

that's floating around with the with the

645

00:28:37,370 --> 00:28:36,000

wind and it has no payload on it that's

646

00:28:39,289 --> 00:28:37,380

going to be less important than

647

00:28:40,669 --> 00:28:39,299

something that has a payload on it which

648

00:28:42,110 --> 00:28:40,679

would be less important than something

649

00:28:44,149 --> 00:28:42,120

that's maneuvering

650

00:28:46,370 --> 00:28:44,159

right so there's there's sort of a

651
00:28:50,330 --> 00:28:46,380
hierarchy of just binning the priorities

652
00:28:52,730 --> 00:28:50,340
because we can't do all of them at once

653
00:28:54,590 --> 00:28:52,740
once we do that and we prioritize them

654
00:28:57,110 --> 00:28:54,600
when we take that package of data in

655
00:28:59,510 --> 00:28:57,120
that case and I have set up two teams

656
00:29:02,029 --> 00:28:59,520
I'll think of this as a red team blue

657
00:29:04,130 --> 00:29:02,039
team or a competitive analysis

658
00:29:07,190 --> 00:29:04,140
I have an intelligence Community team

659
00:29:10,070 --> 00:29:07,200
made up of intelligence analysts and I

660
00:29:11,390 --> 00:29:10,080
have an s t team made up of scientists

661
00:29:13,310 --> 00:29:11,400
and engineers and the people that

662
00:29:15,289 --> 00:29:13,320
actually build a lot of these sensors or

663
00:29:18,289 --> 00:29:15,299

physicists because you know if you're a

664

00:29:19,130 --> 00:29:18,299

physicist you can do anything right

665

00:29:22,310 --> 00:29:19,140

um

666

00:29:24,769 --> 00:29:22,320

and but they're not associated with the

667

00:29:26,930 --> 00:29:24,779

Intel Community they're not Intel

668

00:29:29,090 --> 00:29:26,940

officers so they they look at this

669

00:29:31,430 --> 00:29:29,100

through the lens of the sensor of the

670

00:29:34,549 --> 00:29:31,440

what the data says we give that package

671

00:29:35,930 --> 00:29:34,559

to both teams the intelligence Community

672

00:29:38,029 --> 00:29:35,940

is going to look at it through the lens

673

00:29:40,549 --> 00:29:38,039

of the intelligence record and and what

674

00:29:42,889 --> 00:29:40,559

they assess and their Intel tradecraft

675

00:29:44,630 --> 00:29:42,899

which they have very specific rules and

676

00:29:46,789 --> 00:29:44,640

regulations on how they do that

677

00:29:48,470 --> 00:29:46,799

scientific Community Technical Community

678

00:29:50,870 --> 00:29:48,480

is going to look at it through the lens

679

00:29:53,630 --> 00:29:50,880

of what is the data telling me what is

680

00:29:55,730 --> 00:29:53,640

the sensor doing what would I expect a

681

00:29:58,669 --> 00:29:55,740

sense of response to be

682

00:30:03,049 --> 00:29:58,679

and back that out those two groups give

683

00:30:06,230 --> 00:30:03,059

us their answers we then adjudicate

684

00:30:08,570 --> 00:30:06,240

if they agree then I am more likely to

685

00:30:11,269 --> 00:30:08,580

close that case if they agree on what it

686

00:30:13,070 --> 00:30:11,279

is if they disagree we will have an

687

00:30:14,630 --> 00:30:13,080

adjudication we'll bring them together

688

00:30:17,870 --> 00:30:14,640

we'll take a look at the differences

689

00:30:19,430 --> 00:30:17,880

we'll adjudicate what why do you say one

690

00:30:21,710 --> 00:30:19,440

thing and you say another

691

00:30:24,590 --> 00:30:21,720

we will then come to a case

692

00:30:27,049 --> 00:30:24,600

recommendation

693

00:30:30,289 --> 00:30:27,059

that'll get written up by my team

694

00:30:32,210 --> 00:30:30,299

that then goes to a senior technical

695

00:30:34,070 --> 00:30:32,220

Advisory Group

696

00:30:37,549 --> 00:30:34,080

which is outside of all of those people

697

00:30:38,470 --> 00:30:37,559

made up of senior technical folks and

698

00:30:45,549 --> 00:30:38,480

and

699

00:30:48,470 --> 00:30:45,559

retired out of the community

700

00:30:52,909 --> 00:30:48,480

and they they essentially peer review

701

00:30:54,830 --> 00:30:52,919

what that case recommendation is

702

00:30:57,529 --> 00:30:54,840

they write their recommendations that

703

00:30:59,389 --> 00:30:57,539

comes back to me I review it we make a

704

00:31:00,350 --> 00:30:59,399

determination and I'll sign off one way

705

00:31:02,750 --> 00:31:00,360

or the other

706

00:31:06,049 --> 00:31:02,760

and then that will go out as the the

707

00:31:08,570 --> 00:31:06,059

case determination once we have an

708

00:31:10,970 --> 00:31:08,580

approved web portal to hang the

709

00:31:12,769 --> 00:31:10,980

unclassified stuff we will D you know we

710

00:31:14,269 --> 00:31:12,779

would downgrade and declassify things

711

00:31:16,430 --> 00:31:14,279

and put it out there

712

00:31:19,610 --> 00:31:16,440

in the meantime we're putting a lot of

713

00:31:21,470 --> 00:31:19,620

these on our classified web portal where

714

00:31:22,850 --> 00:31:21,480

we can then collaborate with the rest of

715

00:31:24,710 --> 00:31:22,860

the community so they can see what's

716

00:31:28,130 --> 00:31:24,720

going on

717

00:31:32,210 --> 00:31:28,140

that's in a nutshell that is the process

718

00:31:36,649 --> 00:31:34,730

because of that

719

00:31:40,370 --> 00:31:36,659

that takes time

720

00:31:42,470 --> 00:31:40,380

so of those over 650 you know we've

721

00:31:47,930 --> 00:31:42,480

prioritized

722

00:31:51,350 --> 00:31:47,940

about uh half of them to be of of

723

00:31:53,029 --> 00:31:51,360

um anomalous interesting value

724

00:31:55,130 --> 00:31:53,039

and now we have to go through those and

725

00:31:58,909 --> 00:31:55,140

go how much do I have actual data for

726

00:32:02,810 --> 00:31:58,919

because if all I have is a is a operator

727

00:32:06,289 --> 00:32:02,820

report that says I saw X Y or Z my

728

00:32:08,810 --> 00:32:06,299

assessment is a b or c that's not really

729

00:32:11,330 --> 00:32:08,820

sufficient that's a good place to start

730

00:32:13,370 --> 00:32:11,340

but I have to have data I have to have

731

00:32:14,930 --> 00:32:13,380

radar data I have to have EO data I have

732

00:32:17,630 --> 00:32:14,940

to have thermal data I have to have

733

00:32:19,310 --> 00:32:17,640

overhead data and we need to look at all

734

00:32:21,950 --> 00:32:19,320

that

735

00:32:23,870 --> 00:32:21,960

now from a big picture perspective I

736

00:32:25,370 --> 00:32:23,880

still have that's all they're still very

737

00:32:27,830 --> 00:32:25,380

valuable data

738

00:32:31,310 --> 00:32:27,840

and we're looking at applying a lot of

739

00:32:34,070 --> 00:32:31,320

things new tools analytic tools like

740

00:32:37,070 --> 00:32:34,080

natural language processing so I can go

741

00:32:39,889 --> 00:32:37,080

across all of those reports and look for

742

00:32:42,409 --> 00:32:39,899

commonalities how many of them are being

743

00:32:43,909 --> 00:32:42,419

described as round spherical objects

744

00:32:45,710 --> 00:32:43,919

that are maneuvering how many of them

745

00:32:50,029 --> 00:32:45,720

are not maneuvering how many of them

746

00:32:52,789 --> 00:32:50,039

seem to have a plume to it or note

747

00:32:54,529 --> 00:32:52,799

that's also going to be very valuable to

748

00:32:57,710 --> 00:32:54,539

give us more of a global picture and a

749

00:33:00,230 --> 00:32:57,720

Trends analysis of what are we saying

750

00:33:03,110 --> 00:33:00,240

and help us get to the determination

751
00:33:03,950 --> 00:33:03,120
so go back to your question ma'am we

752
00:33:05,690 --> 00:33:03,960
have

753
00:33:07,970 --> 00:33:05,700
um

754
00:33:09,889 --> 00:33:07,980
this next quarterly report will be

755
00:33:11,649 --> 00:33:09,899
coming out here pretty soon our next

756
00:33:16,669 --> 00:33:11,659
annual report

757
00:33:18,769 --> 00:33:16,679
you all have given us moved it up to to

758
00:33:21,950 --> 00:33:18,779
June July we're going to be having that

759
00:33:24,409 --> 00:33:21,960
done about that time frame and we will

760
00:33:26,630 --> 00:33:24,419
have a we'll be combining a whole number

761
00:33:30,409 --> 00:33:26,640
of reports into that one

762
00:33:34,549 --> 00:33:30,419
uh I think we're currently sitting at

763
00:33:40,430 --> 00:33:36,830

if I remember correct we were around

764

00:33:42,470 --> 00:33:40,440

20 to 30-ish or about halfway through

765

00:33:44,269 --> 00:33:42,480

that analytic process

766

00:33:45,889 --> 00:33:44,279

a handful of them have made it all the

767

00:33:48,529 --> 00:33:45,899

way out to the other side gone through

768

00:33:50,990 --> 00:33:48,539

peer review we've got case closure

769

00:33:53,630 --> 00:33:51,000

reports done and signed

770

00:33:56,630 --> 00:33:53,640

we're going to get faster as we get more

771

00:33:59,750 --> 00:33:56,640

people on board and we get more of the

772

00:34:03,190 --> 00:33:59,760

community tools to automate some of the

773

00:34:09,109 --> 00:34:06,190

yeah thank you madam chair and Dr

774

00:34:11,930 --> 00:34:09,119

Kirkpatrick the odni annual threat

775

00:34:15,050 --> 00:34:11,940

assessment states that China's space

776

00:34:17,889 --> 00:34:15,060

activities are designed to erode U.S

777

00:34:21,290 --> 00:34:17,899

influence across military technological

778

00:34:23,510 --> 00:34:21,300

economic and diplomatic spheres likewise

779

00:34:26,690 --> 00:34:23,520

Russia will remain a key space

780

00:34:29,030 --> 00:34:26,700

competitor in the course of your work

781

00:34:31,909 --> 00:34:29,040

have you become aware of any Chinese or

782

00:34:35,389 --> 00:34:31,919

Russia technical advancements to surveil

783

00:34:38,329 --> 00:34:35,399

or attack U.S interests

784

00:34:40,849 --> 00:34:38,339

so that's a great question part of what

785

00:34:43,810 --> 00:34:40,859

we have to do as we go through these

786

00:34:46,010 --> 00:34:43,820

especially the ones that show

787

00:34:48,889 --> 00:34:46,020

signatures of advanced technical

788

00:34:51,470 --> 00:34:48,899

capabilities is determine if there's a

789

00:34:54,710 --> 00:34:51,480

foreign Nexus

790

00:34:57,230 --> 00:34:54,720

that's really hard if what we observe

791

00:34:59,750 --> 00:34:57,240

doesn't have a Chinese or Russian flag

792

00:35:01,670 --> 00:34:59,760

on the side of it

793

00:35:03,589 --> 00:35:01,680

now

794

00:35:04,190 --> 00:35:03,599

I think it is

795

00:35:06,530 --> 00:35:04,200

um

796

00:35:11,870 --> 00:35:06,540

prudent to say

797

00:35:13,849 --> 00:35:11,880

of the of the cases that are showing

798

00:35:16,069 --> 00:35:13,859

it you know some sort of advanced

799

00:35:18,410 --> 00:35:16,079

technical signature of which we're

800

00:35:22,250 --> 00:35:18,420

talking single percentages of the entire

801
00:35:24,349 --> 00:35:22,260
population of cases we have

802
00:35:26,390 --> 00:35:24,359
um I am concerned

803
00:35:29,690 --> 00:35:26,400
about

804
00:35:32,150 --> 00:35:29,700
what that Nexus is and I have indicators

805
00:35:34,370 --> 00:35:32,160
that some are related to foreign

806
00:35:37,310 --> 00:35:34,380
capabilities

807
00:35:38,690 --> 00:35:37,320
we have to investigate that with our IC

808
00:35:41,329 --> 00:35:38,700
partners

809
00:35:43,430 --> 00:35:41,339
and as we get evidence to support that

810
00:35:47,510 --> 00:35:43,440
that gets then handed off to the

811
00:35:50,089 --> 00:35:47,520
appropriate IC agency to investigate

812
00:35:52,670 --> 00:35:50,099
again it becomes an SCP at that point

813
00:35:57,410 --> 00:35:52,680

yeah somebody else's problem right very

814

00:35:59,930 --> 00:35:57,420

good thank you yes is it is it is it

815

00:36:02,450 --> 00:35:59,940

possible that the Chinese or Russian

816

00:36:04,310 --> 00:36:02,460

Advanced Technologies could could be

817

00:36:07,609 --> 00:36:04,320

causing some of these anomalous

818

00:36:10,690 --> 00:36:07,619

behaviors and and you said there seems

819

00:36:14,870 --> 00:36:10,700

to be some indicators

820

00:36:17,390 --> 00:36:14,880

so just for us today could you describe

821

00:36:22,550 --> 00:36:17,400

Potential Threat that might exist out

822

00:36:24,650 --> 00:36:22,560

there if they are foreign sure Nexus

823

00:36:26,569 --> 00:36:24,660

in order to do this research

824

00:36:30,589 --> 00:36:26,579

appropriately

825

00:36:32,030 --> 00:36:30,599

we have to also be cognizant of what is

826

00:36:35,690 --> 00:36:32,040

the state of the art and Development

827

00:36:37,609 --> 00:36:35,700

Across the s t Community what is what

828

00:36:41,230 --> 00:36:37,619

are the darpas of the world doing what

829

00:36:44,390 --> 00:36:41,240

are our What's the horizon scanning of

830

00:36:45,950 --> 00:36:44,400

emerging Technologies appropriate to

831

00:36:48,470 --> 00:36:45,960

this subcommittee

832

00:36:50,089 --> 00:36:48,480

what is happening out there and if

833

00:36:52,550 --> 00:36:50,099

somebody could accelerate that

834

00:36:54,290 --> 00:36:52,560

capability how would that manifest

835

00:36:56,390 --> 00:36:54,300

itself and what would it look like and

836

00:36:58,089 --> 00:36:56,400

do those signatures match what we're

837

00:37:01,310 --> 00:36:58,099

seeing

838

00:37:05,870 --> 00:37:01,320

there are emerging capabilities out

839

00:37:08,690 --> 00:37:05,880

there that that in many instances

840

00:37:10,550 --> 00:37:08,700

Russia and China well China in

841

00:37:14,450 --> 00:37:10,560

particular are

842

00:37:17,089 --> 00:37:14,460

on par or ahead of us in some areas

843

00:37:19,069 --> 00:37:17,099

all right so previously I used to be the

844

00:37:20,630 --> 00:37:19,079

defense Department's intelligence

845

00:37:23,150 --> 00:37:20,640

officer for Science and Technical

846

00:37:26,510 --> 00:37:23,160

intelligence that was our job was to

847

00:37:29,510 --> 00:37:26,520

look for what does all that look like

848

00:37:31,970 --> 00:37:29,520

um and then you know my last several

849

00:37:35,410 --> 00:37:31,980

years of course in in space command

850

00:37:42,050 --> 00:37:40,190

the the adversary is not

851
00:37:44,089 --> 00:37:42,060
waiting

852
00:37:45,589 --> 00:37:44,099
they are advancing and they're advancing

853
00:37:47,690 --> 00:37:45,599
quickly

854
00:37:49,250 --> 00:37:47,700
if I were to put on some of my old hats

855
00:37:52,970 --> 00:37:49,260
I would tell you

856
00:37:56,030 --> 00:37:52,980
they are less risk-averse at technical

857
00:37:57,890 --> 00:37:56,040
advancement than we are

858
00:37:59,930 --> 00:37:57,900
right they are just willing to try

859
00:38:01,910 --> 00:37:59,940
things and see if it works

860
00:38:04,790 --> 00:38:01,920
are there capabilities that could be

861
00:38:07,130 --> 00:38:04,800
employed against us in both an ISR and a

862
00:38:09,410 --> 00:38:07,140
weapons fashion absolutely

863
00:38:12,190 --> 00:38:09,420

do I have evidence that they're doing it

864

00:38:17,390 --> 00:38:12,200

in these cases

865

00:38:21,950 --> 00:38:19,430

thank you I appreciate that and that's

866

00:38:23,390 --> 00:38:21,960

that is why it's so important that you

867

00:38:25,310 --> 00:38:23,400

are working with the intelligence

868

00:38:27,410 --> 00:38:25,320

Community as well

869

00:38:30,410 --> 00:38:27,420

um because you you have the science the

870

00:38:34,069 --> 00:38:30,420

data background but you also need to

871

00:38:36,470 --> 00:38:34,079

know from various sources what

872

00:38:37,310 --> 00:38:36,480

adversaries may be working on is that

873

00:38:39,410 --> 00:38:37,320

correct

874

00:38:42,109 --> 00:38:39,420

thank you thank you very much thank you

875

00:38:44,270 --> 00:38:42,119

madam chair senator

876

00:38:46,490 --> 00:38:44,280

uh well thank you chair gillibrand

877

00:38:48,470 --> 00:38:46,500

ranking member Ernst this is a really

878

00:38:51,109 --> 00:38:48,480

important hearing I'd like to thank you

879

00:38:53,630 --> 00:38:51,119

Dr Kirkpatrick for your service to the

880

00:38:56,569 --> 00:38:53,640

country and as a former systems analyst

881

00:38:58,730 --> 00:38:56,579

myself I really appreciate your flow

882

00:39:00,770 --> 00:38:58,740

chart the description of the process and

883

00:39:03,170 --> 00:39:00,780

particularly the trends analysis going

884

00:39:05,150 --> 00:39:03,180

forward how that's going to help us and

885

00:39:07,370 --> 00:39:05,160

you've talked about language the large

886

00:39:08,990 --> 00:39:07,380

llms the large language models of

887

00:39:10,630 --> 00:39:09,000

artificial intelligence that's really

888

00:39:13,329 --> 00:39:10,640

going to help us in the hunt forward

889

00:39:16,490 --> 00:39:13,339

predictive analysis I think

890

00:39:17,810 --> 00:39:16,500

to some of your point what we're worried

891

00:39:20,569 --> 00:39:17,820

about but I want to focus on Nevada

892

00:39:23,810 --> 00:39:20,579

because I want to talk about the impact

893

00:39:26,150 --> 00:39:23,820

of uaps on Aviation safety so when it

894

00:39:29,089 --> 00:39:26,160

comes to unified unidentified aerial

895

00:39:30,530 --> 00:39:29,099

phenomenal phenomena excuse me one of my

896

00:39:33,290 --> 00:39:30,540

first concerns is really about the

897

00:39:35,089 --> 00:39:33,300

safety of Nevada's military Aviator

898

00:39:37,730 --> 00:39:35,099

so we have Airman stationed at Nellis

899

00:39:40,010 --> 00:39:37,740

Air Force Base Naval aviators flying at

900

00:39:42,550 --> 00:39:40,020

Naval Air Station Fallon and service

901
00:39:44,990 --> 00:39:42,560
members across from across the world

902
00:39:46,670 --> 00:39:45,000
training at the Nevada test and training

903
00:39:48,589 --> 00:39:46,680
range I know you know all this and

904
00:39:51,589 --> 00:39:48,599
unfortunately the existence of advanced

905
00:39:54,470 --> 00:39:51,599
uaps in the U.S airspace and over U.S

906
00:39:55,790 --> 00:39:54,480
military installations not a new

907
00:39:57,829 --> 00:39:55,800
phenomenon

908
00:40:02,089 --> 00:39:57,839
the Navy's officially acknowledged that

909
00:40:04,730 --> 00:40:02,099
between 2004 and 2021 11 near misses

910
00:40:07,730 --> 00:40:04,740
occurred involving uaps it required

911
00:40:09,890 --> 00:40:07,740
pilot action and follow-up reports as a

912
00:40:12,589 --> 00:40:09,900
result in 2019 the Navy established a

913
00:40:14,930 --> 00:40:12,599

protocol for Pilots to report on their

914

00:40:17,690 --> 00:40:14,940

dangerous encounters so could you speak

915

00:40:19,970 --> 00:40:17,700

to any ongoing efforts within DOD to

916

00:40:23,210 --> 00:40:19,980

ensure the safety of our aviators with a

917

00:40:24,950 --> 00:40:23,220

potential UAP encounter and what's your

918

00:40:27,050 --> 00:40:24,960

relationship with North com NORAD

919

00:40:30,710 --> 00:40:27,060

spacecom when it comes to this immediate

920

00:40:32,450 --> 00:40:30,720

real-time response and how they're

921

00:40:35,230 --> 00:40:32,460

they're right there in the moment right

922

00:40:38,750 --> 00:40:35,240

absolutely that's a great question so

923

00:40:41,270 --> 00:40:38,760

let me start with my relationship with

924

00:40:43,430 --> 00:40:41,280

the commands are are very good I just

925

00:40:45,290 --> 00:40:43,440

came back from uh sitting down with with

926

00:40:47,390 --> 00:40:45,300

General van hurk and all the all the J

927

00:40:49,670 --> 00:40:47,400

staff out at North com a couple weeks

928

00:40:52,310 --> 00:40:49,680

ago talking through exactly what we need

929

00:40:53,569 --> 00:40:52,320

to do to help them get their arms around

930

00:40:57,109 --> 00:40:53,579

us

931

00:40:59,630 --> 00:40:57,119

we are also working very closely with

932

00:41:02,329 --> 00:40:59,640

joint staff and the joint staff has just

933

00:41:04,730 --> 00:41:02,339

been very outstanding in helping work

934

00:41:08,050 --> 00:41:04,740

through policy and guidance issues to

935

00:41:13,490 --> 00:41:10,490

and I would like to just make sure that

936

00:41:16,329 --> 00:41:13,500

we we message back to all of the

937

00:41:19,550 --> 00:41:16,339

operators the importance of their

938

00:41:21,050 --> 00:41:19,560

reporting and the fact that you're about

939

00:41:22,970 --> 00:41:21,060

to get a you know a bunch of new

940

00:41:25,010 --> 00:41:22,980

requirements that we're issuing through

941

00:41:26,990 --> 00:41:25,020

the joint staff

942

00:41:30,230 --> 00:41:27,000

on all of the data that we're going to

943

00:41:33,770 --> 00:41:30,240

need you to save and report back to us

944

00:41:36,170 --> 00:41:33,780

it is invaluable and we are working to

945

00:41:37,790 --> 00:41:36,180

try to to take the most advantage of

946

00:41:39,109 --> 00:41:37,800

that to learn what it is that we're

947

00:41:41,930 --> 00:41:39,119

trying to mitigate

948

00:41:43,930 --> 00:41:41,940

to get directly to your question

949

00:41:46,130 --> 00:41:43,940

first thing that we're doing is

950

00:41:48,050 --> 00:41:46,140

normalizing our reporting right we're

951
00:41:49,810 --> 00:41:48,060
standardizing our reporting and the

952
00:41:51,950 --> 00:41:49,820
requirements associated with that

953
00:41:55,130 --> 00:41:51,960
guidance from The Joint staff I think

954
00:41:56,930 --> 00:41:55,140
goes out maybe this week maybe next week

955
00:41:58,490 --> 00:41:56,940
on that we've been working with them for

956
00:42:00,470 --> 00:41:58,500
some months that does exactly what I

957
00:42:02,150 --> 00:42:00,480
just said it gives them timelines it

958
00:42:05,329 --> 00:42:02,160
gives them requirements it gives them

959
00:42:08,089 --> 00:42:05,339
here's all the data you have to have

960
00:42:10,310 --> 00:42:08,099
um and you got to retain it

961
00:42:13,430 --> 00:42:10,320
the next thing that comes after that is

962
00:42:16,670 --> 00:42:13,440
a plan ORD that will go out to the

963
00:42:18,170 --> 00:42:16,680

commands for mitigation and response so

964

00:42:19,250 --> 00:42:18,180

there's a couple of things that we have

965

00:42:24,170 --> 00:42:19,260

to do

966

00:42:28,010 --> 00:42:24,180

one I need to work with the commands and

967

00:42:30,470 --> 00:42:28,020

with the IC and with our outside of our

968

00:42:32,050 --> 00:42:30,480

DOD and IC Partners to extend our

969

00:42:35,030 --> 00:42:32,060

collection posture

970

00:42:37,250 --> 00:42:35,040

targeted at some of these key areas that

971

00:42:40,130 --> 00:42:37,260

you saw on that heat map

972

00:42:43,550 --> 00:42:40,140

that have a lot of activity so that we

973

00:42:46,130 --> 00:42:43,560

can turn on extra collection when an

974

00:42:47,829 --> 00:42:46,140

operator sees something so part of this

975

00:42:51,170 --> 00:42:47,839

is generating

976
00:42:53,930 --> 00:42:51,180
as a response function in what we call a

977
00:42:55,970 --> 00:42:53,940
tactic technique and procedure for an

978
00:42:58,069 --> 00:42:55,980
operator when he sees something calls

979
00:43:00,530 --> 00:42:58,079
back to the operations floor they can

980
00:43:02,750 --> 00:43:00,540
turn on additional collection what does

981
00:43:04,550 --> 00:43:02,760
that collection look like how do I bring

982
00:43:07,309 --> 00:43:04,560
all that together so I can get more data

983
00:43:09,530 --> 00:43:07,319
on what is that thing can I ask really

984
00:43:11,569 --> 00:43:09,540
quickly do you have the authorities you

985
00:43:15,050 --> 00:43:11,579
need to extend your collection posture

986
00:43:16,849 --> 00:43:15,060
between agencies or or branches of the

987
00:43:19,370 --> 00:43:16,859
military because that seems to me to

988
00:43:20,990 --> 00:43:19,380

maybe be a sticking point I know my

989

00:43:22,270 --> 00:43:21,000

time's just about up I'd love to follow

990

00:43:24,950 --> 00:43:22,280

up about your risk management

991

00:43:26,809 --> 00:43:24,960

methodologies for some of these but do

992

00:43:29,329 --> 00:43:26,819

you need any authorities that you don't

993

00:43:30,829 --> 00:43:29,339

have to uh get get the data there are

994

00:43:32,630 --> 00:43:30,839

some authorities that we need we

995

00:43:35,690 --> 00:43:32,640

currently are operating under title 10

996

00:43:37,849 --> 00:43:35,700

authorities but we have you know good

997

00:43:40,010 --> 00:43:37,859

relationships across the other agencies

998

00:43:42,230 --> 00:43:40,020

but having additional authorities for

999

00:43:43,730 --> 00:43:42,240

collection tasking counterintelligence

1000

00:43:45,589 --> 00:43:43,740

that's something those are all things

1001

00:43:47,690 --> 00:43:45,599

that would be helpful yes

1002

00:43:49,609 --> 00:43:47,700

thank you to follow up Dr Kirkpatrick

1003

00:43:50,990 --> 00:43:49,619

will you help us write that language so

1004

00:43:52,430 --> 00:43:51,000

we can put it in the defense bill this

1005

00:43:55,910 --> 00:43:52,440

year so that we know what authorities

1006

00:43:57,410 --> 00:43:55,920

you need we can do that thank you

1007

00:43:58,609 --> 00:43:57,420

um we're going to start second round so

1008

00:44:00,349 --> 00:43:58,619

if you want to stay you can ask another

1009

00:44:02,210 --> 00:44:00,359

round I have at least three more

1010

00:44:04,069 --> 00:44:02,220

questions so

1011

00:44:06,770 --> 00:44:04,079

do you want to do you want to go right

1012

00:44:19,250 --> 00:44:06,780

now so you in case you have to leave

1013

00:44:22,849 --> 00:44:20,170

um

1014

00:44:25,370 --> 00:44:22,859

spy balloon it did cross through the U.S

1015

00:44:28,130 --> 00:44:25,380

airspace shot down by a Sidewinder

1016

00:44:30,950 --> 00:44:28,140

missile fired from an F-22

1017

00:44:33,109 --> 00:44:30,960

Sidewinders cost us close to half a

1018

00:44:35,450 --> 00:44:33,119

million dollars each

1019

00:44:37,370 --> 00:44:35,460

so given the cost of these missiles the

1020

00:44:39,109 --> 00:44:37,380

cost per flight all of these other

1021

00:44:41,150 --> 00:44:39,119

things like I said follow up on the

1022

00:44:42,589 --> 00:44:41,160

authorities your methodologies the data

1023

00:44:45,170 --> 00:44:42,599

collection they can help us in other

1024

00:44:47,930 --> 00:44:45,180

ways but how do you think we can develop

1025

00:44:50,690 --> 00:44:47,940

a sustainable affordable response to

1026

00:44:53,089 --> 00:44:50,700

uaps where we need to

1027

00:44:55,849 --> 00:44:53,099

um that may that will definitely violate

1028

00:44:58,130 --> 00:44:55,859

our airspace not may definitely violate

1029

00:44:59,809 --> 00:44:58,140

our airspace every chance that they can

1030

00:45:01,730 --> 00:44:59,819

get because there are adversaries they

1031

00:45:03,890 --> 00:45:01,740

want this information so what do you

1032

00:45:07,370 --> 00:45:03,900

think some cost-effective measures might

1033

00:45:08,809 --> 00:45:07,380

be that we can get what we need out of

1034

00:45:10,250 --> 00:45:08,819

that or take them down whatever is

1035

00:45:12,050 --> 00:45:10,260

appropriate whatever the appropriate

1036

00:45:13,970 --> 00:45:12,060

measure is let's put it there so that

1037

00:45:15,650 --> 00:45:13,980

that is actually wrapped into the plan

1038

00:45:18,170 --> 00:45:15,660

ORD that we're working with joint staff

1039

00:45:20,630 --> 00:45:18,180

to send out what are the commands need

1040

00:45:23,809 --> 00:45:20,640

from both a capabilities perspective for

1041

00:45:26,930 --> 00:45:23,819

kinetic and non-kinetic engagements what

1042

00:45:31,250 --> 00:45:26,940

are the response functions of the of the

1043

00:45:33,170 --> 00:45:31,260

particular wings or or navy what have

1044

00:45:36,109 --> 00:45:33,180

you and then

1045

00:45:37,670 --> 00:45:36,119

what authorities do they need so one of

1046

00:45:39,770 --> 00:45:37,680

the one of the challenges that we've

1047

00:45:42,530 --> 00:45:39,780

seen is is you know there's an

1048

00:45:45,650 --> 00:45:42,540

authorities issues with the with the

1049

00:45:46,970 --> 00:45:45,660

owners operators of those ranges that

1050

00:45:49,790 --> 00:45:46,980

they need to work through and we're

1051
00:45:50,990 --> 00:45:49,800
working that with joint staff and nosd

1052
00:45:54,109 --> 00:45:51,000
so

1053
00:45:56,270 --> 00:45:54,119
the big picture we need to do all that

1054
00:45:57,950 --> 00:45:56,280
if you want to get down to the specifics

1055
00:45:59,750 --> 00:45:57,960
for you know there are non-kinetic

1056
00:46:02,589 --> 00:45:59,760
options to engage pretty much everything

1057
00:46:05,210 --> 00:46:02,599
right whether it's electronic warfare

1058
00:46:07,670 --> 00:46:05,220
whether it's you know Laser Technology

1059
00:46:10,430 --> 00:46:07,680
that's where this data having a good

1060
00:46:13,370 --> 00:46:10,440
data collection Predictive Analytics you

1061
00:46:15,170 --> 00:46:13,380
can inform make some assumptions on

1062
00:46:17,750 --> 00:46:15,180
possibilities that's right and we will

1063
00:46:19,849 --> 00:46:17,760

inform uh recommendations back to the

1064

00:46:21,890 --> 00:46:19,859

department on here's what could work

1065

00:46:22,970 --> 00:46:21,900

here's what we've seen work here's what

1066

00:46:24,710 --> 00:46:22,980

doesn't work

1067

00:46:27,170 --> 00:46:24,720

thank you so much thank you madam chair

1068

00:46:29,329 --> 00:46:27,180

I appreciate it thank you very much

1069

00:46:31,010 --> 00:46:29,339

um I just wanted to just talk a little

1070

00:46:33,950 --> 00:46:31,020

bit about your Logistics who you report

1071

00:46:36,230 --> 00:46:33,960

to how that's going uh whether you need

1072

00:46:38,089 --> 00:46:36,240

different reporting Lines by

1073

00:46:39,829 --> 00:46:38,099

Congressional legislation your office is

1074

00:46:41,510 --> 00:46:39,839

administratively located with the office

1075

00:46:43,309 --> 00:46:41,520

of the undersecretary of defense for

1076

00:46:45,050 --> 00:46:43,319

intelligence security but you're not

1077

00:46:47,150 --> 00:46:45,060

substantively subordinate to the under

1078

00:46:49,130 --> 00:46:47,160

secretary rather you are a direct report

1079

00:46:50,569 --> 00:46:49,140

to the deputy secretary are you taking

1080

00:46:52,430 --> 00:46:50,579

Direction directly from the deputy

1081

00:46:54,589 --> 00:46:52,440

secretary are you able to meet and brief

1082

00:46:57,829 --> 00:46:54,599

the deputy secretary

1083

00:46:59,930 --> 00:46:57,839

um is the office of USD ins

1084

00:47:01,609 --> 00:46:59,940

um working with you to have the right

1085

00:47:06,829 --> 00:47:01,619

framework

1086

00:47:10,309 --> 00:47:06,839

so USD ins and the uh I I currently

1087

00:47:13,609 --> 00:47:10,319

report to USD ins

1088

00:47:14,450 --> 00:47:13,619

until they come up with the the plan for

1089

00:47:17,390 --> 00:47:14,460

how they're going to implement

1090

00:47:24,170 --> 00:47:20,930

DOD and dni are working through that now

1091

00:47:27,050 --> 00:47:24,180

I'd have to refer you back to USD ins on

1092

00:47:30,770 --> 00:47:27,060

what their plan is

1093

00:47:34,730 --> 00:47:32,990

do I need to update your reporting

1094

00:47:35,990 --> 00:47:34,740

structure in the next defense bill or is

1095

00:47:37,670 --> 00:47:36,000

this something that you think will work

1096

00:47:39,290 --> 00:47:37,680

its way out or does it need further

1097

00:47:41,210 --> 00:47:39,300

Clarity I think they're planning on

1098

00:47:44,150 --> 00:47:41,220

coming back to you with an answer on

1099

00:47:45,829 --> 00:47:44,160

what that plan is and I think at that

1100

00:47:49,309 --> 00:47:45,839

time that will inform

1101

00:47:52,430 --> 00:47:49,319

what you want to do okay thank you

1102

00:47:53,690 --> 00:47:52,440

um as you know Dr Kirkpatrick Congress

1103

00:47:55,430 --> 00:47:53,700

has mandated that your office

1104

00:47:57,650 --> 00:47:55,440

established a discoverable and

1105

00:48:00,050 --> 00:47:57,660

accessible electronic method for

1106

00:48:02,870 --> 00:48:00,060

potential Witnesses of UAP incidents and

1107

00:48:04,670 --> 00:48:02,880

potential participants in government UAP

1108

00:48:06,470 --> 00:48:04,680

related activities to contact your

1109

00:48:08,569 --> 00:48:06,480

office and tell their stories

1110

00:48:09,410 --> 00:48:08,579

Congress also set up a process whereby

1111

00:48:11,870 --> 00:48:09,420

people

1112

00:48:13,370 --> 00:48:11,880

subject to non-disclosure agreements

1113

00:48:14,630 --> 00:48:13,380

preventing them from disclosing what

1114

00:48:17,089 --> 00:48:14,640

they may have witnessed or participated

1115

00:48:18,589 --> 00:48:17,099

in could tell you what they know that

1116

00:48:21,230 --> 00:48:18,599

risk of Retribution from the or

1117

00:48:22,730 --> 00:48:21,240

violation of their ndas have you

1118

00:48:24,410 --> 00:48:22,740

submitted a public-facing website

1119

00:48:26,870 --> 00:48:24,420

product for approval to your superiors

1120

00:48:30,650 --> 00:48:26,880

and how long has it been under review

1121

00:48:34,609 --> 00:48:30,660

I have we submitted the first version of

1122

00:48:38,630 --> 00:48:36,829

and do you have an estimate from them

1123

00:48:42,710 --> 00:48:38,640

when they will respond and when you'll

1124

00:48:44,390 --> 00:48:42,720

have feedback on that no I don't okay we

1125

00:48:46,370 --> 00:48:44,400

will Author a letter asking for that

1126

00:48:49,190 --> 00:48:46,380

timely response

1127

00:48:51,530 --> 00:48:49,200

um to your superiors oh

1128

00:48:54,349 --> 00:48:51,540

when when do you expect that you will

1129

00:48:57,349 --> 00:48:54,359

establish a public-facing discoverable

1130

00:49:00,890 --> 00:48:57,359

um an access portal for people to use to

1131

00:49:04,130 --> 00:49:00,900

contact your office as the law requires

1132

00:49:07,069 --> 00:49:04,140

so I would like to First say thank you

1133

00:49:09,589 --> 00:49:07,079

all very much for referring the

1134

00:49:12,109 --> 00:49:09,599

witnesses that you have thus far to us I

1135

00:49:14,510 --> 00:49:12,119

appreciate that we've brought in nearly

1136

00:49:16,609 --> 00:49:14,520

two dozen so far it's been it's been

1137

00:49:18,530 --> 00:49:16,619

very uh helpful I'd ask that you

1138

00:49:19,930 --> 00:49:18,540

continue to do that until we have an

1139

00:49:23,210 --> 00:49:19,940

approved plan

1140

00:49:26,270 --> 00:49:23,220

we have a multi-phased approach for

1141

00:49:28,490 --> 00:49:26,280

doing that that we've been uh

1142

00:49:30,530 --> 00:49:28,500

socializing and have submitted for

1143

00:49:32,109 --> 00:49:30,540

approval

1144

00:49:34,670 --> 00:49:32,119

sometime

1145

00:49:37,010 --> 00:49:34,680

and once that happens then we should be

1146

00:49:39,530 --> 00:49:37,020

able to push all that out and get get

1147

00:49:41,329 --> 00:49:39,540

this a little more automated great

1148

00:49:44,270 --> 00:49:41,339

um what I would ask though is as you all

1149

00:49:46,550 --> 00:49:44,280

continue to refer to us and refer

1150

00:49:50,030 --> 00:49:46,560

witnesses to us I'd appreciate if you do

1151

00:49:51,890 --> 00:49:50,040

that please try to prioritize the ones

1152

00:49:55,849 --> 00:49:51,900

that you want to do because we do have a

1153

00:49:57,589 --> 00:49:55,859

small research staff dealing with that

1154

00:49:59,569 --> 00:49:57,599

thank you

1155

00:50:01,190 --> 00:49:59,579

um and then do you have any uh plans for

1156

00:50:03,349 --> 00:50:01,200

public engagement that you want to share

1157

00:50:06,109 --> 00:50:03,359

now that you think it's important that

1158

00:50:08,809 --> 00:50:06,119

the public knows what the plan is

1159

00:50:11,589 --> 00:50:08,819

so we have a uh

1160

00:50:14,089 --> 00:50:11,599

a number of public engagement

1161

00:50:15,309 --> 00:50:14,099

recommendations according to our

1162

00:50:18,109 --> 00:50:15,319

strategic plan

1163

00:50:20,750 --> 00:50:18,119

all of those have been submitted for

1164

00:50:22,250 --> 00:50:20,760

approval they have to be approved by USD

1165

00:50:24,770 --> 00:50:22,260

ins

1166

00:50:27,230 --> 00:50:24,780

are waiting for approval to go do that

1167

00:50:29,930 --> 00:50:27,240

okay I will follow up on that

1168

00:50:31,430 --> 00:50:29,940

um and then my last question is about

1169

00:50:33,410 --> 00:50:31,440

um

1170

00:50:35,210 --> 00:50:33,420

the integration of departments UAP

1171

00:50:37,730 --> 00:50:35,220

operations research analysis and

1172

00:50:40,550 --> 00:50:37,740

strategic Communications

1173

00:50:42,530 --> 00:50:40,560

um during the recent UAP incidents over

1174

00:50:45,230 --> 00:50:42,540

North America it didn't appear that you

1175

00:50:46,670 --> 00:50:45,240

were allowed to play that role do you

1176

00:50:48,230 --> 00:50:46,680

agree that the public perception is

1177

00:50:49,670 --> 00:50:48,240

generally that you and your office did

1178

00:50:50,990 --> 00:50:49,680

not appear to play a major role in the

1179

00:50:53,049 --> 00:50:51,000

Department's response to the detection

1180

00:50:55,670 --> 00:50:53,059

of objects over North America

1181

00:50:57,230 --> 00:50:55,680

what can you tell us that's going on

1182

00:50:59,569 --> 00:50:57,240

behind the scenes from your perspective

1183

00:51:02,030 --> 00:50:59,579

and in the after action assessment

1184

00:51:03,470 --> 00:51:02,040

process is there awareness that there is

1185

00:51:06,650 --> 00:51:03,480

a need to operate differently in the

1186

00:51:09,109 --> 00:51:06,660

future and a commitment to doing so

1187

00:51:12,049 --> 00:51:09,119

when the when the objects were first

1188

00:51:15,890 --> 00:51:12,059

detected I got called by joint staff

1189

00:51:19,430 --> 00:51:15,900

leadership uh to come in uh late one

1190

00:51:22,849 --> 00:51:19,440

night to review events as they were unfo

1191

00:51:24,829 --> 00:51:22,859

unfolding and to give them a you know an

1192

00:51:25,930 --> 00:51:24,839

assessment based on what we knew at that

1193

00:51:29,450 --> 00:51:25,940

time

1194

00:51:33,109 --> 00:51:29,460

I did that I worked with the director of

1195

00:51:35,750 --> 00:51:33,119

joint staff the J2 and the j3 that night

1196

00:51:38,210 --> 00:51:35,760

and over the couple of following days on

1197

00:51:40,430 --> 00:51:38,220

what are the types of things that we are

1198

00:51:43,130 --> 00:51:40,440

tracking from a unidentified object

1199

00:51:45,650 --> 00:51:43,140

perspective what databases do we use

1200

00:51:48,829 --> 00:51:45,660

those sorts of things for for Norm for

1201

00:51:50,410 --> 00:51:48,839

known objects known tracking

1202

00:51:53,690 --> 00:51:50,420

um

1203

00:51:55,430 --> 00:51:53,700

beyond that the response I would have to

1204

00:51:57,829 --> 00:51:55,440

I would have to refer you back to the

1205

00:52:01,730 --> 00:51:57,839

White House for the decision on how they

1206

00:52:04,549 --> 00:52:01,740

did the response we did not play a role

1207

00:52:05,930 --> 00:52:04,559

in what you would respond other than

1208

00:52:06,589 --> 00:52:05,940

that initial

1209

00:52:08,569 --> 00:52:06,599

um

1210

00:52:13,609 --> 00:52:08,579

you know advice on what we are seeing

1211

00:52:20,329 --> 00:52:16,849

thank you Matt thank you madam chair

1212

00:52:23,030 --> 00:52:20,339

um Dr Kirkpatrick I I know that your

1213

00:52:26,390 --> 00:52:23,040

office has gotten a lot of attention uh

1214

00:52:28,910 --> 00:52:26,400

recently and of course any new agency

1215

00:52:32,690 --> 00:52:28,920

there tends to be a push to increase

1216

00:52:34,609 --> 00:52:32,700

size and and funding we want to make

1217

00:52:37,490 --> 00:52:34,619

sure that you're able to meet your goals

1218

00:52:40,069 --> 00:52:37,500

but what I also need to ensure is that

1219

00:52:42,829 --> 00:52:40,079

we're not duplicating or replicating

1220

00:52:46,549 --> 00:52:42,839

existing functions and creating

1221

00:52:49,609 --> 00:52:46,559

redundancy within DOD and the

1222

00:52:52,609 --> 00:52:49,619

interagency so what steps are you taking

1223

00:52:56,690 --> 00:52:52,619

right now to make sure that your

1224

00:53:00,589 --> 00:52:56,700

particular office and function is is

1225

00:53:03,049 --> 00:53:00,599

unique uh to any of the other agencies

1226
00:53:04,970 --> 00:53:03,059
that might be involved in these types of

1227
00:53:08,450 --> 00:53:04,980
cases yeah that's a that's a great

1228
00:53:10,609 --> 00:53:08,460
question so I would like to lay down

1229
00:53:12,589 --> 00:53:10,619
here's here's one of my

1230
00:53:15,650 --> 00:53:12,599
sort of my mission and my goal and my

1231
00:53:18,049 --> 00:53:15,660
vision here so the vision is at one

1232
00:53:20,870 --> 00:53:18,059
point at some point in the future

1233
00:53:23,030 --> 00:53:20,880
you should not need an arrow if I'm

1234
00:53:25,309 --> 00:53:23,040
successful in what I'm doing we should

1235
00:53:27,650 --> 00:53:25,319
be able to normalize everything that

1236
00:53:30,650 --> 00:53:27,660
we're doing into existing processes

1237
00:53:32,390 --> 00:53:30,660
functions agencies and organizations and

1238
00:53:34,910 --> 00:53:32,400

make that part of their mission and

1239

00:53:38,809 --> 00:53:34,920

their role right now the niche that we

1240

00:53:41,450 --> 00:53:38,819

form is really going after the unknowns

1241

00:53:45,049 --> 00:53:41,460

if you I think you articulated it early

1242

00:53:47,089 --> 00:53:45,059

on this is a Hunt mission for what might

1243

00:53:48,829 --> 00:53:47,099

somebody be doing in our backyard that

1244

00:53:51,290 --> 00:53:48,839

we don't know about

1245

00:53:53,690 --> 00:53:51,300

all right well that that that is what we

1246

00:53:55,490 --> 00:53:53,700

are doing right but at some point we

1247

00:53:57,349 --> 00:53:55,500

should be able to normalize that that's

1248

00:53:59,510 --> 00:53:57,359

why it's so important the work we're

1249

00:54:03,349 --> 00:53:59,520

doing with joint staff to normalize that

1250

00:54:05,809 --> 00:54:03,359

into pilot DOD policy and guidance

1251

00:54:08,030 --> 00:54:05,819

we are bringing in all of our

1252

00:54:11,270 --> 00:54:08,040

interagency partners so NASA is

1253

00:54:13,910 --> 00:54:11,280

providing a liaison for us I have FBI

1254

00:54:15,829 --> 00:54:13,920

liaison I have OSI liaison I have

1255

00:54:19,069 --> 00:54:15,839

service Liaisons

1256

00:54:20,150 --> 00:54:19,079

the ice half of my staff come from the

1257

00:54:22,849 --> 00:54:20,160

IC

1258

00:54:24,710 --> 00:54:22,859

half of my staff come from other

1259

00:54:27,710 --> 00:54:24,720

scientific and Technical backgrounds I

1260

00:54:29,510 --> 00:54:27,720

have doe and so what we're trying to do

1261

00:54:34,069 --> 00:54:29,520

is Ensure

1262

00:54:36,829 --> 00:54:34,079

again as I make UAP into sap they get

1263

00:54:38,870 --> 00:54:36,839

handed off to the people that that is

1264

00:54:40,670 --> 00:54:38,880

their mission to go do

1265

00:54:42,890 --> 00:54:40,680

so that we aren't duplicating that I'm

1266

00:54:44,809 --> 00:54:42,900

not going to go chase the Chinese high

1267

00:54:47,210 --> 00:54:44,819

altitude balloon for example that's not

1268

00:54:49,790 --> 00:54:47,220

my job it's not an unknown and it's not

1269

00:54:52,670 --> 00:54:49,800

anomalous anymore now it goes over to

1270

00:54:54,530 --> 00:54:52,680

them come on very good thank you madam

1271

00:54:57,950 --> 00:54:54,540

chair

1272

00:54:59,809 --> 00:54:57,960

um I wanted just to follow up on the

1273

00:55:02,210 --> 00:54:59,819

filters for surveillance outside

1274

00:55:04,730 --> 00:55:02,220

observers have speculated that DOD sets

1275

00:55:06,410 --> 00:55:04,740

filters on certain sensors to eliminate

1276

00:55:08,710 --> 00:55:06,420

objects that are moving really fast or

1277

00:55:10,849 --> 00:55:08,720

slow because what we are looking for

1278

00:55:14,150 --> 00:55:10,859

militarily are conventional aircraft and

1279

00:55:16,370 --> 00:55:14,160

missiles UAP that doesn't fit into these

1280

00:55:18,710 --> 00:55:16,380

programs would thereby be weeded out and

1281

00:55:20,270 --> 00:55:18,720

never noticed this special speculation

1282

00:55:22,250 --> 00:55:20,280

was proven to be true during the UAP

1283

00:55:24,410 --> 00:55:22,260

incident over North America where DOD

1284

00:55:26,690 --> 00:55:24,420

publicly acknowledged that we were able

1285

00:55:28,809 --> 00:55:26,700

to start seeing these uops only when we

1286

00:55:31,069 --> 00:55:28,819

opened up these filters

1287

00:55:32,930 --> 00:55:31,079

obviously our military operators cannot

1288

00:55:35,030 --> 00:55:32,940

be overloaded with objects that are not

1289

00:55:36,710 --> 00:55:35,040

conventional aircraft or missiles can

1290

00:55:39,049 --> 00:55:36,720

you nonetheless make sure that the raw

1291

00:55:40,670 --> 00:55:39,059

data is being captured and subsequently

1292

00:55:43,309 --> 00:55:40,680

processed that your office knows what's

1293

00:55:44,870 --> 00:55:43,319

really out there and is that going to

1294

00:55:49,130 --> 00:55:44,880

cost money will you expect to pay for

1295

00:55:53,990 --> 00:55:51,589

one of the key tenants that we're trying

1296

00:55:56,210 --> 00:55:54,000

to do in our science plan is understand

1297

00:56:00,049 --> 00:55:56,220

what those signatures are

1298

00:56:03,410 --> 00:56:00,059

so we get all the raw for example radar

1299

00:56:05,690 --> 00:56:03,420

data prior to the scrubbing and

1300

00:56:08,990 --> 00:56:05,700

filtering to allow it to enter into our

1301
00:56:11,990 --> 00:56:09,000
weapon systems and our detection systems

1302
00:56:14,750 --> 00:56:12,000
we are now taking all that data and

1303
00:56:16,430 --> 00:56:14,760
cross-correlating it to what pilots are

1304
00:56:20,930 --> 00:56:16,440
saying they're seeing or other

1305
00:56:23,690 --> 00:56:20,940
observations from other operators

1306
00:56:26,390 --> 00:56:23,700
what that allows us to do is then see if

1307
00:56:30,290 --> 00:56:26,400
there are any any signatures in that

1308
00:56:32,030 --> 00:56:30,300
data that I can pull out generate uh

1309
00:56:34,849 --> 00:56:32,040
what we'll call automatic Target

1310
00:56:37,549 --> 00:56:34,859
recognition algorithms that allow us to

1311
00:56:43,250 --> 00:56:37,559
then use that signature associated with

1312
00:56:45,470 --> 00:56:43,260
a observed UAP whatever that UAP may be

1313
00:56:48,589 --> 00:56:45,480

we will then make those recommendations

1314

00:56:50,510 --> 00:56:48,599

of what those changes should be back to

1315

00:56:54,290 --> 00:56:50,520

the department so the deputy secretary

1316

00:56:55,849 --> 00:56:54,300

had asked me last October to make those

1317

00:56:59,750 --> 00:56:55,859

recommendations what changes do we need

1318

00:57:02,030 --> 00:56:59,760

to make to Radars to uh platforms to

1319

00:57:04,309 --> 00:57:02,040

detection systems and algorithms to to

1320

00:57:06,109 --> 00:57:04,319

pull on those those algorithms and make

1321

00:57:07,549 --> 00:57:06,119

those changes that's going to take some

1322

00:57:10,010 --> 00:57:07,559

time that's where the research and

1323

00:57:12,710 --> 00:57:10,020

development comes in right it's not

1324

00:57:13,910 --> 00:57:12,720

it's not instantaneous right now a lot

1325

00:57:22,730 --> 00:57:13,920

of the

1326

00:57:25,609 --> 00:57:22,740

ranges of those filters have been

1327

00:57:27,650 --> 00:57:25,619

identified by people in the loop and you

1328

00:57:31,250 --> 00:57:27,660

can't have people in the loop all the

1329

00:57:34,250 --> 00:57:31,260

time it's just not cost effective

1330

00:57:36,710 --> 00:57:34,260

so part of our budget is working through

1331

00:57:38,390 --> 00:57:36,720

what is what does that look like

1332

00:57:40,970 --> 00:57:38,400

and then making those recommendations

1333

00:57:46,010 --> 00:57:40,980

back to the big program offices for them

1334

00:57:49,309 --> 00:57:48,049

my last question is about the academic

1335

00:57:51,170 --> 00:57:49,319

Community

1336

00:57:52,670 --> 00:57:51,180

um can you give us an update on sort of

1337

00:57:55,849 --> 00:57:52,680

how you collaborate with the academic

1338

00:57:57,770 --> 00:57:55,859

community and whether how the

1339

00:58:01,430 --> 00:57:57,780

independent study being done by NASA

1340

00:58:03,290 --> 00:58:01,440

complements arrows work sure

1341

00:58:05,150 --> 00:58:03,300

two questions so I'm going to try to

1342

00:58:07,190 --> 00:58:05,160

make it quick the uh

1343

00:58:10,790 --> 00:58:07,200

in 1979

1344

00:58:13,609 --> 00:58:10,800

Carl Sagan said extraordinary claims

1345

00:58:15,530 --> 00:58:13,619

require extraordinary evidence

1346

00:58:18,589 --> 00:58:15,540

I would go one step further and I would

1347

00:58:19,849 --> 00:58:18,599

say extraordinary claims require not

1348

00:58:21,950 --> 00:58:19,859

only extraordinary evidence but

1349

00:58:23,930 --> 00:58:21,960

extraordinary science and so how do you

1350

00:58:27,290 --> 00:58:23,940

do that you do that with the scientific

1351

00:58:30,890 --> 00:58:27,300

method right so as arrow is developing

1352

00:58:33,890 --> 00:58:30,900

and implementing its science plan it has

1353

00:58:36,829 --> 00:58:33,900

to do so grounded in a solid foundation

1354

00:58:39,109 --> 00:58:36,839

of scientific theory across the entire

1355

00:58:42,470 --> 00:58:39,119

range of hypotheses

1356

00:58:44,690 --> 00:58:42,480

that have been presented for what UAP

1357

00:58:48,710 --> 00:58:44,700

are

1358

00:58:52,490 --> 00:58:48,720

that range spans adversary breakthrough

1359

00:58:55,010 --> 00:58:52,500

technology on one hand known objects and

1360

00:58:56,450 --> 00:58:55,020

phenomena in the middle all the way to

1361

00:58:58,250 --> 00:58:56,460

the extreme theories of

1362

00:59:02,750 --> 00:58:58,260

extraterrestrials

1363

00:59:04,549 --> 00:59:02,760

all of that has physics-based signatures

1364

00:59:07,670 --> 00:59:04,559

associated with it whether it's

1365

00:59:10,250 --> 00:59:07,680

theoretical from the academic community

1366

00:59:11,470 --> 00:59:10,260

known from things like Hypersonic

1367

00:59:14,930 --> 00:59:11,480

weapons

1368

00:59:17,510 --> 00:59:14,940

or adversary breakthrough Technologies

1369

00:59:19,730 --> 00:59:17,520

as we've talked about before

1370

00:59:21,170 --> 00:59:19,740

the known objects that we have to go

1371

00:59:24,349 --> 00:59:21,180

measure

1372

00:59:28,069 --> 00:59:24,359

the idea is across that entire range you

1373

00:59:30,710 --> 00:59:28,079

have to come up with peer-reviewed

1374

00:59:33,049 --> 00:59:30,720

scientific basis for all of it

1375

00:59:36,470 --> 00:59:33,059

the academic Community plays a very big

1376

00:59:38,329 --> 00:59:36,480

role on the one end of the spectrum

1377

00:59:40,609 --> 00:59:38,339

the intelligence community on the other

1378

00:59:41,750 --> 00:59:40,619

end of the spectrum and then measurement

1379

00:59:44,990 --> 00:59:41,760

in the middle

1380

00:59:49,210 --> 00:59:45,000

once I have those signatures identified

1381

00:59:51,589 --> 00:59:49,220

in invalidated peer-reviewed

1382

00:59:53,809 --> 00:59:51,599

documents then I have something to point

1383

00:59:55,430 --> 00:59:53,819

to for all that data

1384

00:59:57,230 --> 00:59:55,440

because all that data is going to match

1385

00:59:59,569 --> 00:59:57,240

one of those signatures

1386

01:00:02,569 --> 00:59:59,579

right and then I can go well it's that

1387

01:00:05,690 --> 01:00:02,579

and not that or it's that

1388

01:00:09,109 --> 01:00:05,700

and that helps us go through all that

1389

01:00:12,470 --> 01:00:09,119

where NASA comes in and and the the

1390

01:00:15,770 --> 01:00:12,480

study that they're doing which um

1391

01:00:21,109 --> 01:00:15,780

uh supporting is

1392

01:00:23,930 --> 01:00:21,119

really looking at the unclassified data

1393

01:00:26,990 --> 01:00:23,940

sources that might be used to augment

1394

01:00:29,030 --> 01:00:27,000

our classified data sources to

1395

01:00:31,370 --> 01:00:29,040

understand if there's a signature there

1396

01:00:34,849 --> 01:00:31,380

we can pull on so very similar to The

1397

01:00:39,589 --> 01:00:37,250

civil capabilities so for example we

1398

01:00:42,170 --> 01:00:39,599

have a lot of climate science satellites

1399

01:00:43,609 --> 01:00:42,180

for example that look at Earth

1400

01:00:45,530 --> 01:00:43,619

lots of them

1401
01:00:48,530 --> 01:00:45,540
how many of those

1402
01:00:51,950 --> 01:00:48,540
is the data valuable

1403
01:00:55,309 --> 01:00:51,960
in seeing these kinds of objects

1404
01:00:58,130 --> 01:00:55,319
the challenge in that is those those

1405
01:01:00,049 --> 01:00:58,140
platforms don't necessarily have the

1406
01:01:02,690 --> 01:01:00,059
resolution you need so if you remember

1407
01:01:04,789 --> 01:01:02,700
the slide I put up there with the trends

1408
01:01:07,789 --> 01:01:04,799
the size of the objects we're looking

1409
01:01:09,410 --> 01:01:07,799
for are typically reported to be one to

1410
01:01:11,630 --> 01:01:09,420
four meters

1411
01:01:14,510 --> 01:01:11,640
well the resolution of many of the

1412
01:01:17,030 --> 01:01:14,520
climate science civil um science you

1413
01:01:19,130 --> 01:01:17,040

know civil satellites was much larger

1414

01:01:20,750 --> 01:01:19,140

than that which means you'd have a hard

1415

01:01:24,109 --> 01:01:20,760

time picking out something that's

1416

01:01:26,450 --> 01:01:24,119

smaller than a pixel on the imagery on

1417

01:01:28,849 --> 01:01:26,460

the data that's not to say all of it's

1418

01:01:30,349 --> 01:01:28,859

not useful and there are ways of pulling

1419

01:01:32,569 --> 01:01:30,359

through that data and going through that

1420

01:01:35,510 --> 01:01:32,579

is what NASA is focused on right now is

1421

01:01:37,430 --> 01:01:35,520

what is what are some other data sources

1422

01:01:41,270 --> 01:01:37,440

that could be used in addition things

1423

01:01:43,789 --> 01:01:41,280

like open source and crowdsourcing of of

1424

01:01:45,589 --> 01:01:43,799

data we're exploring public-private

1425

01:01:47,329 --> 01:01:45,599

Partnerships ma'am as you know we've

1426

01:01:50,930 --> 01:01:47,339

talked about in the past

1427

01:01:52,450 --> 01:01:50,940

to look at is there a way to

1428

01:01:55,010 --> 01:01:52,460

smartly

1429

01:01:56,630 --> 01:01:55,020

crowdsource additional data that might

1430

01:02:00,589 --> 01:01:56,640

be useful

1431

01:02:02,870 --> 01:02:00,599

to augment some of my classified sources

1432

01:02:04,430 --> 01:02:02,880

and what does that look like and how

1433

01:02:06,890 --> 01:02:04,440

would we do it so that we're not

1434

01:02:13,789 --> 01:02:06,900

overwhelmed by you know everybody who

1435

01:02:16,730 --> 01:02:15,530

else like to tell the committee before

1436

01:02:18,410 --> 01:02:16,740

we close

1437

01:02:19,250 --> 01:02:18,420

don't you have another round yeah do you

1438

01:02:21,230 --> 01:02:19,260

have anything else you'd like to tell

1439

01:02:23,390 --> 01:02:21,240

the committee before we close thank you

1440

01:02:25,430 --> 01:02:23,400

very much for allowing us to come and

1441

01:02:27,349 --> 01:02:25,440

share a little bit of insight into what

1442

01:02:28,789 --> 01:02:27,359

arrow is up to and what we're doing I

1443

01:02:31,010 --> 01:02:28,799

hope to be able to share a whole lot

1444

01:02:33,349 --> 01:02:31,020

more in the future

1445

01:02:35,690 --> 01:02:33,359

um we have a lot of work to do so if you

1446

01:02:38,089 --> 01:02:35,700

don't hear from me outside it's because

1447

01:02:39,829 --> 01:02:38,099

we've got a lot of work to do